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ABSTRACT
Suicidal Terrorism, A Dying Strategy
By Michael Jessee Adkins

This study identifies a causal model for suicidal terrorism consisting of
three primary blocks of factors. First, terrorist organizations must desire to expel
a social entity from a geographic area and typically operate with a perception of
religious asymmetry. Second, members of terrorist organizations must undergo
active exposure to specific socialization practices that directly glorify martyrdom
and render suicidal behavior socially acceptable within the context of their
community. Third, terrorist organizations must adopt an organizational
philosophy that indicates they are capable of achieving victory. This study
analyzes the characteristics of several high-profile terrorist organizations to
demonstrate the noted factors are causally responsible for the emergence of
suicidal terrorism. All information was gathered exclusively from textual sources.
Given a clear identification of causation, several strategies are proposed to
counter the looming threat of suicidal terrorism.
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Introduction

This body of research is directed toward understanding the sociological
factors that give rise to the perpetration of suicidal terrorist attacks. Identifying
causal factors of suicidal terrorism will help facilitate strategies directed toward
preventing such actions. This particular brand of terrorism emerged in the early
1900‟s and has progressively increased in frequency and lethality. This body of
research primarily focuses on suicidal terrorist acts that have occurred during the
past three decades. The threat of suicidal terrorism is of paramount concern to
the United States. This project seeks to provide an objective analysis, rooted in
sociology, which will clearly define the problem, identify causal factors, and
propose theoretical solutions.
The proposed model of causation for suicidal terrorism focuses on a sixblock process. Block 1 refers to the process by which a social entity develops a
grievance against a government. Block 2 refers to the establishment of a terrorist
organization. The terrorist organization then follows a triadic process that leads to
the implementation of suicidal tactics. The triadic process is composed of blocks
3, 4, and 5. Each stage of the triadic process must be met before terrorists result
to suicidal tactics. Failure to meet any part of the triadic process will result in a
failure to adopt suicidal tactics. Block 3 refers to specific precipitating factors that
include (in order of general magnitude) a desire for expulsion, a perceived
religious asymmetry, and/or a perceived cultural threat. Block 4 encompasses
the socialization, specific to martyrdom, which gives rise to altruism. Block 5
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refers to the establishment of a perception that the terrorists can win. Block 6
refers to the actual adoption of suicidal terrorist tactics. The model of causation is
best illustrated by the flow chart in figure 1.
Each block of the triadic process is not necessarily mutually exclusive in
terms of a linearly defined developmental stage. Blocks 3, 4, and 5 can operate
independently from each other but they often occur during the same time. The
combination of factors described in the triadic process constitutes causation for
terrorist organizations to adopt suicidal tactics. All components of the triadic
process are necessary preconditions for the establishment of suicidal terrorism
perpetrated by terrorist groups. However, the triadic process requires the
presence of all three factors in concert to establish sufficient causation for the
organizational decision to perpetrate suicidal terrorism.
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Chapter 1: Defining Terrorism

Defining the modern phenomenon known as terrorism has become
problematic in recent years. No single definition has secured universal
acceptance. However, some basic commonalities exist between most popular
definitions. These commonalities include the use of violence, the desire to send a
political or religious message, and the targeting of innocent people. The
establishment of at least one primary grievance is a precondition for the
establishment of a terrorist organization. Many terrorist groups establish multiple
grievances against a national entity. Some common grievances include the
desires to create an independent nation, to secure autonomy, to oust a foreign
occupation, to fundamentally change an existing government‟s style of
government, and a general desire to gain power. Most terrorists operate in
subnational groups that represent a political or religious minority. They often
believe the use of violence will attract attention to their cause and aid their
endeavor to change a societal component. “The group possesses collective
preferences or values and selects terrorism as a course of action from a range of
perceived alternatives” (Crenshaw, 1998, p. 8). Common terrorist acts include
kidnapping, hijacking, assassinations, assaults, and remote/timed detonation of
explosives. “The general purpose of terrorist acts is to frighten the target
audience: indeed the word terrorism is derived from the Latin root terrere, which
means „to frighten‟” (Snow, 2007, p. 277).
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Defining terrorism depends much on the perspective of the definer. Some
contend that one person‟s terrorist is another‟s freedom fighter. Most suicidal
terrorists do not see themselves as terrorists but as holy agents of radical socioreligious change, liberators, or martyrs. Thus, from the perspective of the
perpetrator, such acts are completely justified. Most suicide attackers prefer the
label of martyr. Many perpetrators believe their targets, including women and
children, are not innocent. Members of Islamic Jihad, for example, frequently and
intentionally target Israeli women and children by detonating suicide bombs in
public places. They believe all Jewish residents are guilty of occupying
Palestinian land and thus deserve to die. This sentiment is flatly rejected by most
of the world community. The simple and overwhelmingly accepted truth is that
there is no excuse or justification for terrorizing innocent people. Those who
believe otherwise are extremists who do not represent the views of the greater
world population.
Terrorism is usually described within the context of three primary variants
that include organizational terrorism, insurgency, and state sponsored terrorism.
Each variant is not necessarily mutually exclusive from the others. Some terrorist
organizations, such as Al-Qaeda, have become robust and dynamic by adopting
multivariate terrorist strategies. Examining the noted variants will equip the
reader with a framework for understanding the nature of terrorism.
A radical, politically homogeneous, and tightly knit minority usually
perpetrates organizational terrorism (The Vice President‟s Task Force on
Combating Terrorism, 2002, p. 1). They are not able to muster mainstream
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political support for their agenda. They adopt terrorist tactics to intimidate their
adversaries and draw attention to their cause. Organizational terrorists can
operate inside and/or outside of their home country or area of residence. The
modern trend is for organizational terrorists to adopt transnational terror tactics
directed toward influencing an audience and ultimately changing a governmental
policy. “The most notorious example of a transnational terrorist group that is
basically of the organizational variant is the Abu Nidal Organization, a radical
Palestinian group that has targeted civilians indiscriminately in its terrorist
operations in many different countries” (The Vice President‟s Task Force on
Combating Terrorism, 2002, p. 1).
Insurgency is a variant of terrorism that is usually manifested by means of
a large revolt against a government or political entity (The Vice President‟s Task
Force on Combating Terrorism, 2002, p. 1). Ethnic separatists, who carry out
terrorist missions, often in great frequency and with great subversion, are best
categorized as insurgencies. Primary examples of insurgencies are the actions
carried out by the Iraqi militant group commanded by Muqtada al Sadr. His
insurgent group primarily became operational in 2004 and carried out terrorist
attacks on U.S. assets and Iraqi civilians. Iraq is plagued with a vast amount of
insurgent terrorist factions that fight each other as well as U.S. forces. Each
insurgent group pursues its own political and/or religious agenda and is willing to
commit acts of terrorism to advance its agenda. They feel that they are not able
to adequately influence the government via democratic and/or bureaucratic
means.
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State sponsored terrorism is the third variant. This type of terrorism is
funded, aided, or otherwise supported by sovereign nations who often attempt to
hide, mask, or deny their support for terrorist operations (The Vice President‟s
Task Force on Combating Terrorism, 2002, p. 1). Establishing influence over
foreign or domestic policy motivates them. “Some states sponsor terrorism to
create or expand their power and influence among ideological or religious
movements, or as a means of establishing credentials with revolutionary
movements worldwide” (The Vice President‟s Task Force on Combating
Terrorism, 2002, p. 2). Hizballah is a prime example of a state sponsored terrorist
organization. “Iran created the Hizballah movement, and some of Hizballah‟s
cadres are directly tied to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard contingent in
Lebanon” (The Vice President‟s Task Force on Combating Terrorism, 2002, p.
16).
Given the variants of terrorism, several prominent definitions follow.
Mattox (2004) has defined it as “Politically motivated attacks, including
assassinations and hijackings, usually inflicted on civilian targets” (p. 9). The
Dictionary of Modern War defines terrorism as “The use of violence against
civilians by covert or clandestine organizations for political purposes” (Luttwak &
Koehl, 1991, p. 609). The United States Government has defined terrorism as
“premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant
targets by subnational groups or clandestine state agents, usually to influence an
audience” (The Vice President‟s Task Force on Combating Terrorism, 2002, p.
viii). The basic operational definition of terrorism, for this body of work, is:
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premeditated, politically and/or religiously motivated violence, intentionally
directed toward innocent people for a coercive purpose.
This project primarily deals with suicidal terrorist organizations. The
establishment of a regular terrorist organization is a precondition for the
emergence of a suicidal terrorist organization. Terrorists do not simply start a
campaign using suicidal tactics. They first use standard terrorist tactics and later
employ suicidal tactics. The operational definition of suicidal terrorism, for this
body of work, is: premeditated, politically and/or religiously motivated violence,
intentionally directed toward innocent people for a coercive purpose, which
resulted in the intentional self-destruction, or attempted self-destruction, of the
perpetrator during a climactic moment of the violence. Most instances of suicidal
terrorism involve a perpetrator using his or her body as part of a delivery
mechanism for an explosion. A clear example of suicidal terrorism is the
assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in 1991. A young woman detonated a bomb,
concealed on her body, when she was within close proximity to Gandhi.
Given the operational definition of suicidal terrorism, it is important to
clarify some key circumstances that fail to meet the definition. Some terrorists
engage in suicidal assaults in which they attack targets knowing that they will
eventually be killed in the process by security forces. Although such missions
may be suicidal in nature, they fail to meet the operational definition of suicidal
terrorism because the perpetrators do not succumb to self-destruction. Rather,
an opposing force kills them. Moreover, some terrorists commit suicide to avoid
capture or after being captured. These suicides fail to qualify as suicidal terrorism
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because the terrorists‟ death is not associated with a delivery mechanism
directed toward a climactic moment of violence resulting in the death or injury of
other people. These types of suicide, associated with terrorism, are not included
in the chronology of suicidal attacks that appears in the appendix.
The described operational definition of suicidal terrorism is exclusive to
this body of work. It may not apply to other works involving suicidal terrorism.
Suicidal attacks against United States military targets within Iraq are not included
within the body of this work or in the appendix describing a chronology of attacks.
This exclusion is due to the precarious situation involving the conflict between
Iraqi insurgents and U.S. military forces. It is a matter of great debate as to
whether insurgent attacks constitute guerrilla warfare or terrorism. In an effort to
circumvent this controversy, this work intentionally omits circumstances of
suicidal attacks against U.S. military personnel within Iraq. However, a plethora
of examples of Iraqi insurgent suicidal attacks against other Iraqis is included.
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Chapter 2: Terrorist Organizations
This chapter‟s goal is to present an overview of the various terrorist
organizations that employ suicidal tactics. The following information is not
exhaustive and does not include the many terrorist groups who do not use
suicidal tactics. Ten primary terrorist groups have conducted the overwhelming
majority of suicidal terrorist attacks during the last three decades. Each of these
groups has established goals that serve to define their organization. The
agendas of these groups can overlap or contrast with the goals of other terrorists.
Terrorism is predominantly a social movement involving the development of
social groups. Individuals rarely conduct suicidal terrorist operations without first
securing membership in an established terrorist group that is waging a defined
campaign.
Al-Qaeda is a terrorist network that is directly responsible for numerous
attacks on U.S. interests abroad and the deadly homeland attacks of September
11, 2001. Founded by Usama bin Laden in 1988, Al-Qaeda seeks to oust all
western influence from the Middle East and establish states that will adhere to
Islamic law. Other objectives include the destruction of Israel, dislodging U.S.
Military assets from Iraq, and establishing a safe haven for terrorist training
camps. The organization has also publicly called for all Muslims to personally
wage war on Americans. They once operated a plethora of terrorist training
camps in Afghanistan. However, U.S. military actions have eliminated much of
their ability to conduct open and prolonged training operations. “While the bulk of
the al Qaeda leadership settled in sympathetic areas of Pakistan, the
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organization remained widespread, playing a supportive role on behalf of terrorist
groups associated with Islam” (Westwood, 2003, p. 230). Al-Qaeda‟s network
extends around the world. No single country exclusively houses its members.
They are known to employ sophisticated components of modern technology to
facilitate their activities (Berkowitz, 2003, p. 15). They globally seek and recruit
disgruntled groups of Muslims who constitute militias, terrorist cells, and tribal
factions. One of the most well known social groups, recruited by al-Qaeda, is the
Taliban. They are composed of tribal militants who share common grievances
with al-Qaeda and are primarily operational within Afghanistan and Pakistan.
According to Sir Martin Ewans (2002), many members of the Taliban are “ready
to invite martyrdom for their cause” (p. 209). Al-Qaeda generates funding from
drug trafficking, credit card fraud, fake charities, and especially from personal
donations from supporters.
The Black September Organization emerged in the mid 1970‟s as a
terrorist group who violently supports the destruction of Israel and the
establishment of a Palestinian nation. “The group contends that both inter-Arab
and intra-Palestinian terrorism are needed to precipitate an all-embracing Arab
revolution that alone can lead to the liberation of occupied Palestine” (The Vice
President‟s Task Force on Combating Terrorism, 2002, p. 5). Its members are
primarily operational in Lebanon, Israel, Syria, and parts of Europe. The group
has historically received state sponsorship from Iraq, Libya, and Syria but
generates independent funding through a host of illegal processes. Black
September also operates under the names Black June Organization, Arab

12
Revolutionary Brigades, and the Abu Nidal Organization (The Vice President‟s
Task Force on Combating Terrorism, 2002, p. 5). Another terrorist group, known
as Fatah, also used the name Black September from 1971 through 1974.
The Chechen Rebels are a conglomeration of insurgent terrorist groups
seeking to establish an independent state under Islamic law. Their organizational
philosophy closely adheres to militant Islamic fundamentalism. Their grievances,
rooted in over 100 years of conflict, are primarily with the Russian government.
Russian forces conquered Chechnya in the mid 1800‟s despite violent opposition
from fighters, such as Imam Shamil, who desired to create an Islamic nation. The
Soviet Union granted autonomy to much of the Chechnya region during the early
1900‟s. However, problems reemerged when Josef Stalin ordered the mass
deportation of Chechens in 1944 on the basis that they were believed to have
conspired with German forces. Many of the remaining Chechens were outraged
by this incident and they began to develop armed resistance cells and a social
movement directed toward a nationalist goal. The Chechen Rebels viewed the
1991 collapse of the Soviet Union as a golden opportunity to establish a state.
They declared independence and established a constitution in 1992. Russia did
not recognize their proclamation and subsequently deployed large numbers of
troops to the region in 1994. The years following the deployment were marked by
a series of mutual attacks. The Chechen Rebel leadership imposed Islamic law
beginning in 1999 and terrorist attacks substantially increased in frequency. The
Chechen Rebels have emerged as a highly effective terrorist organization
responsible for hundreds of innocent deaths and high profile incidents. They
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make use of suicidal tactics and are especially known for employing female
suicide bombers who are often referred to as Black Widows. The Chechen
Rebels are responsible for the incredibly fatal 2004 Russian aircraft bombings
and siege of a Russian school. Other terrorist acts include numerous suicide
bombings throughout the country and the 2002 siege of a Moscow theater. The
Chechen Rebels remain a vigilant and determined terrorist organization, despite
ongoing Russian counterterrorism operations.
Fatah is a terrorist organization whose objective is to create a secular
Palestinian state. The group was originally dedicated to reclaiming all of Israel.
However, many members have recently contended that they may be willing to
accept the creation of a geographically smaller state within the general area of
the West Bank. “Formed by Palestinian exiles in Kuwait in 1957, the Fatah
surfaced in 1959 and began to mount raids into Israel in January 1965” (The Vice
President‟s Task Force on Combating Terrorism, 2002, p. 12). The organization
expanded rapidly following the Six Day War of 1967 and was once spearheaded
by Yasir Arafat. Fatah has also used the names al-Asifa and Black September.
The latter identification was only used from 1971 through 1974.
Hamas serves as a political party, relief service, and terrorist organization.
It was founded in 1987 by a group of high-profile Islamic clerics (Davis, 2004, p.
99). The organization started as a political branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in
the West Bank and Gaza and it attracted a range of supporters from varied
socioeconomic backgrounds (Davis, 2004, p. 99). The group finds refuge in all
areas heavily populated by people of Palestinian identity. Their primary objective
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is to secure a Palestinian state, principally within Israel. This group also conducts
limited humanitarian relief missions that have served to increase its popularity
and social acceptance. Public support resulted in the group winning Palestinian
Parliamentary elections in 2006. Hamas retains a group of facilitators that
conducts arms smuggling activities and fundraising in Syria and Lebanon. Iran is
strongly suspected of providing additional support. Hamas has generated a large
amount of funding from charities posing as humanitarian relief organizations.
Prior to 2002, many of the noted charities were operational within the United
States, Europe, and the Middle East. Subsequent counter-terrorism measures,
especially the FBI‟s Operation Green Quest, have dramatically reduced or
eliminated Hamas‟s ability to generate funding from U.S. sources.
Hizballah is an Iranian sponsored terrorist organization that integrates
social, political, religious, ideological, and militant components (The Vice
President‟s Task Force on Combating Terrorism, 2002, p. 15). This group
became operational during the early 1980‟s with the direct and continued support
of Iran. “The Hizballah and the Revolutionary Guards work in close concert on
terrorist operations” (The Vice President‟s Task Force on Combating Terrorism,
2002, p. 15). Support has also been clandestinely provided by Syria. The group
is also known to generate capital via subversive fundraising activities in the
United States and Europe. This movement desires to rid the region of Western
influence, secure legitimate political authority, establish a Shiite Islamic state
within Lebanon, and conduct violent operations against the state of Israel.
Hizballah strongly and violently supports ousting all Jews from Jerusalem and
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promoting a Palestinian state. The group primarily operates in Lebanon with
training operations occurring in the Bekaa Valley. Hizballah is directly responsible
for numerous suicidal bombings within Israel. They are able to quickly recruit,
train, assist, supply, and deploy suicidal bombers primarily originating from
Palestinian refugee camps. They garner widespread local support, especially
from Palestinians, by providing limited humanitarian relief and launching antiZionist propaganda campaigns. They follow radical Islamic Shiite ideology and
identify with the views brokered by Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah and the late
Ayatollah Khomeini. Hizballah uses several operational names including Islamic
Jihad, Organization of the Oppressed, Party of God, and the Revolutionary
Justice Organization (The Vice President‟s Task Force on Combating Terrorism,
2002, p. 15).
The PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) is a Kurdish terrorist organization that
is primarily operational in Southern Turkey and Northern Iraq. Founded in 1974,
by Abdullah Ocalan, the group is mostly a Marxist-Leninist organization seeking
to establish an independent state for the Kurdish people and expel Turkish
military presence from Kurdish towns. Members believe they have received an
unequal distribution of resources from the Turkish and Iraqi governments and
have been victimized by ethnic injustice. Saddam Hussein is known to have
violently attacked and killed thousands of Kurds with chemical weapons.
However, all of the PKK‟s violent terrorist activity to date has been directed
exclusively toward Turkish interests. Northern Iraq has served as a fragile safehaven for the group especially after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. However,
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the potential for Turkish military action, along the border of northern Iraq, is
growing. This group is not associated with radical Islamic agendas. The PKK is
also known as Kongra-Gel, Kurdish Freedom Hawks, Kurdistan People's
Congress, and The People's Defense Force.
The Shiite Insurgency of Iraq is a fragmented and decentralized
conglomeration of terrorist cells. This particular network developed after the
United States invaded Iraq in 2003. Their primary goals are to promote a
withdrawal of U.S. military forces, establish Shiite political superiority, and
conduct sectarian violence against the Sunni community. These terrorists often
develop into well-armed militias. “Some are affiliated with the government, some
are highly localized, and some are wholly outside of the law” (Baker & Hamilton,
2006, p. 5). They employ a multitude of tactics including ambushes, kidnapping,
detonating bombs, staging executions, and suicide operations. Iran‟s
Revolutionary Guards have provided material support, including explosively
formed penetrators, to Shiite insurgent organizations.
The Sunni Insurgency of Iraq is also a fragmented and decentralized
conglomeration of terrorist cells. This network developed after the United States
invaded Iraq in 2003. “The insurgency comprises former elements of the Saddam
Hussein regime, disaffected Sunni Arab Iraqis, and common criminals” (Baker &
Hamilton, 2006, p. 3). Many Sunni Insurgent leaders were members of Saddam
Hussein‟s Baath Party. This political party was rendered illegitimate during the
initial year of the U.S. invasion of Iraq. “The de-Baathification order created a
class of disenfranchised, threatened leaders” (Ricks, 2006, p. 191). Their primary
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goals are to promote the withdrawal of U.S. military forces, establish Sunni
political superiority, and conduct sectarian violence against the Shiite community.
These terrorists typically operate in small groups. They employ a host of tactics
to include conducting ambushes, sniper assaults, kidnapping, exploding bombs,
staging executions, and suicide operations. A minority of wealthy residents of
Saudi Arabia is strongly suspected of providing funding and moral support for
Sunni insurgent organizations.
The Tamil Tigers (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) is a terrorist group
that became operational in the 1970‟s. “Long the strongest Sri Lankan militant
group, the LTTE is the only major group that has fought the Indian Peacekeeping
Force in Sri Lanka” (The Vice President‟s Task Force on Combating Terrorism,
2002, p. 120). Having presented several grievances against the Sri Lankan
government, they strongly desire to establish a separate state. Other objectives
include sabotaging Sri Lankan political processes, preventing Indian troops from
operating in Northern Sri Lanka, stopping the ideological spread of Buddhism
from threatening Tamil culture, and gaining widespread international attention for
the humanitarian problems suffered by the Tamils. The Tamil Tigers have
launched multiple successful suicide missions as well as a plethora of
conventional attacks against the Sri Lankan government. They are not
ideologically bound by any religious philosophy but they fear the influence of
Buddhism. However they strongly value their culture to the extent that they are
willing to fight and die to preserve it. They are “a Marxist-Leninist group whose
members are from Hindu families but who are adamantly opposed to religion”
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(Pape, 2005, p. 4). The suicidal component of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam is known as the “Black Tigers.”
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Chapter 3: Precipitating Factors

Several key factors contribute to the emergence of martyrdom among
terrorists. “Religion, culture, and identity serve as „tool kits‟ from which organizers
of collective action strategically select narratives, traditions, symbols, rituals, or
repertories of action to imbue risky activism with morality” (Hafez, 2006, p. 61).
These factors are illustrated in block 3 of the triadic process of causation for
suicidal terrorism and they serve to bolster the potential for mobilization. The key
factors are: the desire for expulsion, religious asymmetry, and/or perceived threat
to a cultural identity. These factors are not mutually exclusive and they can often
overlap with the initial grievance(s) that paved way for the founding of a terrorist
origination. However, after a terrorist organization is founded, these factors serve
to push the organization toward adopting suicidal tactics. All suicidal terrorist
organizations strongly desire to expel an entity from a geographic location.
Groups often perceive that they are being occupied or influenced by a social
group who identifies with a different religion. The term “religious asymmetry”
refers to the situation in which a terrorist organization proclaims adherence to a
particular religion that is different than the perceived religion of their enemy.
Many terrorist organizations conduct suicidal operations because they believe
that an outside force threatens the survival of their cultural identity. These
factors, combined with certain socialization practices and a belief in the potential
for winning, set the stage for the emergence of suicidal terrorism.
The United States of America has been victimized by suicidal terrorist
attacks at home and abroad. The horrific events of September 11, 2001
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exemplify the enemies‟ determination to terrorize the American public.
Embassies and tourists have historically been attacked abroad. Even the military
has felt the blow of suicidal terrorists. Public safety can be achieved only by an
unwavering commitment to eradicate terrorism. Such a commitment necessitates
understanding, not only how, but also why suicidal attacks occur. Two terrorist
organizations, Al-Qaeda and Hizballah, have conducted the majority of suicidal
terrorist attacks against U.S. targets. These organizations have well defined
grievances against the U.S. An examination of these organizations and their
grievances will reveal valuable information explaining why they target the United
States.
Al-Qaeda seeks to expel all western influence and presence from the
Middle East (Pape, 2005, p. 42). Their primary grievance with the United States
is rooted in vehement opposition to the presence of U.S. military forces in the
Middle East generally and in Saudi Arabia specifically. Their secondary
grievance focuses on a perception that Western/American values corrupt Islamic
values. American society is generally accepting of premarital sex, alcohol
consumption, liberal fashion trends, divorce, feminism, and religious diversity.
The lifestyles associated with such actions are inversely related to the ideals
perpetuated by Islamic Fundamentalism. Members of al-Qaeda feel threatened
by the social transmission of American lifestyles. Thus, they perceive a threat to
their culture. Al-Qaeda combats their perceived threat by means of terrorism.
Hizballah also strongly opposes the presence of U.S. troops in the Middle
East, especially in areas within close proximity to Israel. They adamantly contest
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U.S. support for Israel. The U.S. has veto power within the United Nations and
has used that power to override U.N. actions unfavorable to Israeli operations.
For example, Israel has waged war against terrorist organizations in neighboring
states. Israel has received sharp international criticism for their ability to conduct
these military operations because innocent people inadvertently suffer from such
operations. If the U.N. presents a resolution to cease a given operation then the
U.S. will likely veto that measure in support of Israel. Moreover, the U.S. has
provided Israel with weapon systems and aircraft that have been used against
terrorists in neighboring states. Israel would undoubtedly become a substantially
weaker state without such overwhelming support from the U.S. Palestinians,
seeking a nationalist goal, views the United States as a primary obstacle to their
endeavor. Hizballah seeks to directly combat the United States through a
campaign of terrorism. They attacked the U.S. embassy on April 18, 1983 by
means of a truck bomb and killed over 60 people. Their most notable attack
occurred on October 23, 1983 when they employed a truck bomb to attack a U.S.
Marine facility in Lebanon. The suicidal attack produced over 200 U.S.
casualties.
The Arab-Israeli conflict is central to much of the violence in the Middle
East and to the radical Islamic fundamentalist hatred toward the U.S. An
overview of the conflict will shed light on the foundation of the Islamic
fundamentalist grievances against the U.S. The modern state of Israel is seated
along the eastern shoreline of the Mediterranean Sea. The land has historically
been occupied by a plethora of groups and is often referred to as historic
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Palestine. This land is considered native soil to Hebrew Tribes who immigrated
there and ruled the area as Israelites. They eventually created a Jewish nation,
named Judea, in 168 BC. However, their nation was toppled by the Roman
Empire approximately 300 years later. Many Jews were forced to relocate to
other geographic areas. The years that followed the Roman acquisition and rule
by the Ottoman Empire resulted in an influx of Arabs into the area and it was
subsequently referred to as Palestine. The Jewish community slowly began to
adopt a strategy of a gradual reoccupation. The Ottoman Empire was toppled
during the end of World War One and Palestine fell under Western authority.
Britain subsequently sanctioned autonomy to both Arabs and Jews who occupied
Palestine but they did not initially establish clear geographic boundaries for such
autonomy. Tensions escalated between Arabs and Jews over control over the
land until it was officially partitioned by Britain in 1922. The Jordan River then
served as the official partition between what was established as the Emirate of
Transjordan to the West and Palestine to the East. This geographical partition
precipitated tensions between Arabs and Jews to the extent that they began to
wage low intensity warfare against each other and jointly oppose Britain. The
Zionist movement gained substantial momentum following the horrific events
associated with the holocaust of World War Two. Much of the world community
sympathized with Jews and favored the reestablishment of a Jewish state.
Accordingly, the state of Israel was officially established in 1948. The founding of
the state of Israel outraged several key Arab states. An Arab-Israeli war ensued
with Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq, and Transjordan combating Israel. The Israelis
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emerged victories despite sustaining heavy casualties. “Israel captured the West
Bank, the Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem” (Pape, 2005, p. 47). However, many
Palestinians were displaced and forced to live in refugee camps. General
hostilities continued especially over access to the Suez Canal. However, the
United States brokered the Camp David Accords in 1979 that lead to an
agreement between Israel and Egypt in which Egypt regained land to include the
Sinai Peninsula. In turn, Israel secured diplomatic relations and relative peace
with Egypt. This resolution was widely condemned by much of the Arab world to
the extent that Egypt was ousted from the Arab League. Festering tensions
resulted in the first intifada (uprising) in which Palestinians engaged in mass riots
and perpetrated organized terrorism against the Israelis. The Palestinian uprising
was predominantly invoked by control over the regions known as the West Bank
and Gaza Strip although the Syrians exacerbated the issues by staking claim to
the Golan Heights. The first intifada sparked international pressure to develop a
peace process. An opportunity presented itself during the end of Operation
Desert Storm, a U.S. dominated offensive against Iraq that included multinational
assistance from both the Western and Arab countries, in 1991. The unique
partnership between Arab and Western powers paved way for the establishment
of the Madrid Conference of 1991. The conference was largely a mutually
symbolic event characterized by Israelis, Arabs, and Westerners working
together to resolve the disputed land occupied by Israelis. The conference did
not result in a definitive resolution but it did pave the way for the Oslo Accords of
1993 in which secret negotiations were held in Norway. These negotiations
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resulted in an agreement to gradually transfer power to Palestinians in some
areas. Subsequent agreements stipulated that areas within the Gaza Strip would
be granted Palestinian autonomy, Israeli Defense Forces would withdraw from
key locations, and the expansion of Israeli settlement would halt in other areas.
The implementation of these ill-defined agreements proved problematic and both
sides disagreed on who would control Jerusalem. Tensions invariably escalated
and a second intifada that was launched in 2000. All Palestinian terrorist
organizations stepped up attacks against Israel who, in turn, responded with
military strikes. The situation continued to deteriorate and violence escalated.
Israeli military action peaked in 2006 when Israeli Defense Forces launched an
all out assault against Hizballah within Lebanon. This assault was marked by
plethora of noncombatant casualties on both sides. Israel significantly, though
temporarily, damaged Hizballah‟s operational capability. Much of southern
Lebanon‟s infrastructure was severely damaged, thousands of civilians were
displaced, and the economy of both nations suffered. The violence was mitigated
by a United Nations resolution for a ceasefire. An agreement was established in
which Israeli and Hizballah combatants jointly withdrew from Southern Lebanon
and allowed Lebanese military forces and a small UN force to occupy the area.
Given the long history of violence and grievances rooted in historic events
spanning several hundred years, the prospect for peace is dim at best.
The eradication of terrorism necessitates a keen understanding of how
and why suicidal attacks occur. Al-Qaeda and Hizballah have conducted a series
of spectacular suicidal terrorist attacks against the United States. Both
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organizations have adopted radical Islamic fundamentalist principles that serve to
justify their actions from their perspective. The role of the United States, in terms
of its support for Israel, exacerbates an already intense hatred and desire to
terrorize American citizens. Understanding the dynamics of this situation will
enable policy makers to maximize the effectiveness of foreign policy and
developed strategies for eradicating terrorism.
Members of every suicidal terrorist organization desire to expel a social
entity from what they perceive and/or define as their homeland. Many terrorist
organizations differ in whom they target for expulsion. However, all suicidal type
terrorist groups are currently attempting to expel their enemy from particular
geographic locations. Al-Qaeda wants to expel Western military forces from the
Middle East. Black September desires to expel all Israelis from Israel. The
Chechen Rebels want to expel Russian forces from their historic homeland.
Fatah‟s current goal is to expel Israelis from the West Bank. Hamas is dedicated
to expelling all Jews and foreign entities from Israel. One of Hizballah‟s primary
missions is to oust foreign military forces from Lebanon. The PKK seeks to expel
Turkish influence from semi-autonomous regions within southern Turkey. The
Shiite Insurgency desires to expel foreign military forces and Sunni influence.
The Sunni Insurgency desires to expel foreign military forces and Shiite
influence. The Tamil Tigers aspire to oust the Sri Lankan government from
regions that were previously under Tamil control. All of the noted terrorist
organizations employ suicidal tactics and vehemently desire an expulsion.
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Members of al-Qaeda believe that Western influence corrupts Islamic
values. They perceive that the West is waging a war against Islam. Accordingly,
they have adopted terrorism tactics that are directed in large part toward the
expulsion of Western influence. They see such influence as a threat to their
culture and way of life. Pape (2005) noted the following:
Although Saudi Arabia is not under American military occupation, at least
from the perspective of the United States, and although the terrorists have
political objectives against the Saudi regime and others, one major
objective of al-Qaeda is the expulsion of U.S. troops from the country. (p.
42)
Black September has attempted to expel Israelis from Israel by means of
terrorism. This group contends that the Palestinian people are the rightful heirs to
the land that is now established as the state of Israel. They believe that the
Israelis are occupying their homeland. Consequently, they have brutally fought
to re-establish Palestinian control and ownership of the noted land. Black
September‟s primary objective has been to provoke an expulsion (The Vice
President‟s Task Force on Combatting Terrorism, 2002, p. 5).
The Chechen Rebels have a long history of waging an expulsion
campaign directed toward ousting Soviet/Russian forces from the greater
Chechnya area. Many Chechens have historically opposed Soviet/Russian rule.
Achieving autonomy within the Soviet Union temporarily mitigated their
opposition. However, the collapse of the U.S.S.R. led to a revitalization of the
nationalist movement. Their chief objective is to expel Russian authority,

27
influence, and security personnel from Chechnya. They operate from a belief that
Russian military personnel have violated their human rights.
Fatah‟s present objective is to expel Israelis from the West Bank. They too
believe the Israelis are occupying their native soil. Unlike other Palestinian
organizations, Fatah is seeking the establishment of a secular state (The Vice
President‟s Task Force on Combatting Terrorism, 2002, p. 12). They operate
from the underlying perception that they were severely victimized by the
establishment of the Israeli state. Unable to tolerate their perceived victimization,
they resort to terrorist tactics directed toward expelling their enemy.
Members of Hamas also believe the Israelis are occupying their native
land (Pape, 2005, p. 47). They conduct suicidal operations in an effort to oust the
Jewish presence. The matter is exacerbated by a dual attachment to the city of
Jerusalem. Both Jews and Muslims believe that the city is religiously sacred.
Hamas strongly desires to expel all Jewish presence from Israel and especially
from sites sacred to Islam.
Hizballah has a multitude of strategic goals. One of several primary
objectives is to prevent the Israeli Defense Forces from operating within
Lebanon. The organization is largely composed of militant Shiite Islamic
fundamentalists. “The Hizballah espouses an intense hatred of any influence that
does not support its views of Shi‟a Muslim ideology” (The Vice President‟s Task
Force on Combatting Terrorism, 2002, p. 15). They maintain that the
Palestinians, who live mostly in refugee camps within Lebanon, have consistently
suffered from attacks brokered by Israel. Hizballah also views the United States
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as a substantial threat because of its ongoing political and material support for
Israel. Accordingly, Hizballah also seeks to expel United States military assets
from the greater Middle East.
The PKK has a primary objective of establishing a Kurdish homeland
(Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001, 2002, p. 98). Accomplishing their goal
requires at least one expulsion. The Kurds currently manage autonomous
regions within northern Iraq and semi-autonomous regions within southern
Turkey and northwestern Iran. This terrorist group represents a minority within
the Kurdish cultural community yet they seek to expel Turkish influence from
southern Turkey.
The Shiite Insurgency of Iraq wishes to establish political and cultural
control over most of Iraq. Shiites were a political minority and underwent gross
discrimination, by way of intentional political exclusion, during the reign of
Saddam Hussein. The United State‟s 2003 invasion of Iraq has resulted in a
power vacuum that Shiites are attempting to fill. A minority of the Shiite
community has resorted to suicidal terrorism as a means of establishing power.
Accomplishing their goal requires the expulsion of United States military forces
and Sunni influence.
The Sunni Insurgency of Iraq desires to institute political and cultural
control over much of Iraq. Sunnis were a numerical minority yet they constituted
the political majority. They were granted special privileges during the reign of
Saddam Hussein. The United States‟ 2003 invasion of Iraq has caused a power
void that Shiites are aggressively attempting to fill. A minority of the Sunni
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community has resorted to suicidal terrorism as a means of establishing power.
However, the operational minority enjoys vast support from the greater Sunni
community. Accomplishing their goals will require the expulsion of United States
military forces and Shiite influence.
The Tamil Tigers are pursuing the establishment of an independent Tamil
nation (The Vice President‟s Task Force on Combatting Terrorism, 2002, p. 120).
Their terrorist actions are not motivated by radical religious philosophies. They
specifically want to create a Tamil state within Sri Lanka‟s northern and eastern
provinces. Like all other terrorist groups, they are unable to accomplish their
objective by peaceful means so they have resorted to orchestrating a plethora of
suicidal attacks and employing standard guerrilla warfare tactics. Indian military
forces once combated the Tamil Tigers and served as a peacekeeping force. The
Tamil Tigers succeeded in expelling Indian peacekeeping forces by means of
guerrilla warfare but failed to use suicidal attacks against the Indians. The Tamil
Tigers believe that they must continue efforts to expel Sri Lankan political and
religious influence in order to establish a state in what they perceive as their
native land.
In summary, every terrorist organization that has employed suicidal tactics
has clearly manifested a desire to expel a political or cultural entity from a
particular geographic area. However, many other terrorist organizations that do
not resort to suicidal tactics also desire expulsions. The Basque separatist
organization (ETA) is a terrorist group seeking independence and an expulsion
yet they do not wage a campaign using suicidal tactics. Accordingly, the desire
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for expulsion is a precipitating causal factor that is necessary, but not singularly
sufficient, for the establishment of suicidal terrorism.
Religious differences also serve to precipitate the emergence of suicidal
terrorism. Many terrorist organizations strongly identify with religious beliefs.
Their targets often identify with a religion that is very different from that of the
terrorists. For example, al-Qaeda identifies with radical Islamic fundamentalism.
Members of al-Qaeda believe that the United States is a Christian state. This
creates a perception of religious asymmetry. In reality, the United States does
not unilaterally adopt a national religious identity. Rather, individual citizens are
free to exercise any religious belief. Christianity is arguably the most popular
religious system within America. Thus, terrorists have the perception that the
U.S. is a Christian state. It doesn‟t matter if their perception is correct or not. If
they believe something is true then they will act in accordance with their beliefs.
The mechanics of human perception is critical when considering consequences
of beliefs. Merton (1967) stated, “once they have assigned some meaning to the
situation, their consequent behavior and some of the consequences of that
behavior are determined by the ascribed meaning” (p. 422). Terrorist
organizations that believe they are fighting a country with a different religious
identity are more prone to adopt suicidal tactics. Moreover, the notion of religious
asymmetry also applies to opposing components or sects within the same
general religion. Eight of the ten described terrorist organizations encompass the
notion of a religious asymmetry between the coercer and the coerced.
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“The politics of religious difference is central to al-Qaeda‟s campaign of
suicide terrorism against the United States” (Pape, 2005, p. 119). They are
practitioners of Wahhabism and Salafism but they adhere to a radical side of the
Islamic Fundamentalist spectrum. The radicalized versions of these beliefs are
not compatible with a peaceful religious coexistence with other cultural groups.
Radical Wahhabism seeks to demonize other religions and even other forms of
Islam. It calls for adherence to a strict ancient code and views any deviation as
sacrilegious. “Houses and clothes must be plain; joking, music, and gold
ornaments are forbidden” (Noss, 1960, p. 737). Radical Salafism encompasses
similar beliefs and focuses on the credibility associated with the direct scriptures
and actions involving the prophet Mohammed (Pape, 2005, p. 106). Both sects
promote a movement toward adopting more traditional lifestyles while rejecting
the legitimacy of any other religious tradition. Al-Qaeda maintains that people
with a different religious affiliation are infidels. Thus, Al-Qaeda operates with a
religious asymmetry. They employ their radical beliefs in an effort to justify their
actions. “Like all major religions, Islam prohibits the killing of innocents, a
principle that Islamic fundamentalists have „reinterpreted‟ in order to justify
precisely such acts” (Pape, 2005, p. 223). Pape (2005) found the following:
Throughout virtually all the statements, interviews, sermons, and books by
Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda leaders over the past decade, the United
States is portrayed as a religiously motivated „Crusader‟ on an aggressive
mission to subdue, occupy, and transform Muslim societies. (p. 119)

32
Al-Qaeda‟s perception of religious asymmetry is a precipitating factor causally
related to the perpetration of suicidal terrorist attacks against the United States.
The Black September Organization is a Palestinian terrorist group that
vehemently opposes a diplomatic resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
This group has historically attacked moderate Muslims as well as Jews. They
have adopted a radical Islamic fundamentalist organizational philosophy. They
operate with a well-defined religious asymmetry. This asymmetry is a
precipitating factor that has fostered an ideology that is accepting of suicidal
terrorism.
The Chechen Rebels predominantly subscribe to militant Islamic
fundamentalism. In fact, most Chechens are a part of a distinctive Muslim group.
They officially adopted Islamic law in 1999. Many Chechens practice a peaceful
existence but the Chechen Rebels defiantly operate from a perception of
religious asymmetry. Subscribers of militant Islamic fundamentalism function
from a perspective that maintains a categorical opposition to any belief system
that differs from their own. They frequently demonize alternative religions and
even alternative perspectives within Islam.
The terrorist organizations known as Hamas and Hizballah identify
strongly with Shiite Muslim ideology. Unlike Black September, they do not
routinely attack other Muslims. However, they do adamantly seek the
establishment of a Palestinian state on what is now Israeli land. Their religious
asymmetry is rooted in the divide between Muslims and Jews. Both groups‟
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concept of religious asymmetry serves to precipitate the development and
implementation of suicidal terrorism.
The Shiite Insurgency of Iraq, as an organization, has adopted a radical
Shiite philosophy that stands at odds with both the United States‟ military
occupation and the Sunni political minority. Shiite insurgents are stubbornly
opposed to the U.S. occupation because they believe that it represents a
Christian encroachment upon Muslim land. Moreover, they are also opposed to
the Sunni minority. Thus, they perceive a religious asymmetry both within Islam
and outside of Islam. The noted asymmetry is a precipitating factor leading to
suicidal terrorism.
The Sunni Insurgency of Iraq, as an organization, has adopted a radical
Islamic type of philosophy that stands at odds with the United States‟ military
occupation and the Shiite political majority. Sunni insurgents are tenaciously
opposed to the U.S. occupation because they believe it represents a Christian
infringement upon Muslim land that serves to pervert fundamental Islamic values.
The Sunni Insurgency has launched far more attacks against U.S. and Iraqi
targets than their Shiite insurgent counterparts. Moreover, they are also opposed
to the Shiite political majority. They also perceive a religious asymmetry both
within Islam and outside of Islam. The prominent asymmetry is a precipitating
issue leading to their suicidal terror campaign.
The Tamil Tigers are a terrorist group that lacks a radical religious
comportment as part of their organizational philosophy. However, they do
operate from a perception of religious asymmetry and cultural threat. The Tamils
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have a largely Hindu culture that stands at odds with the Buddhist ethnicity
associated with Sinhalese culture (Baker, 1998, p. 158). Their religious stance is
more defensive than offensive insofar as they desire to thwart the spread of
Buddhism to their communities. They are not attempting to establish a religious
state, violently seek a mass conversion, or use religion as a primary reason for
launching operations. Stated differently, the Tamil Tigers have not attempted to
violently export their religion but they endeavor to stop the import of Buddhist
ideology.
The Tamil Tigers operate from a perception of a threat to their cultural
identity. “The rise of Tamil militancy parallels the increasing Sinhalese
encroachment on Tamil culture and resources” (Pape, 2005, p. 141). They feel
particularly vulnerable to cultural change that can occur as a result of the spread
of Buddhism. Pape (2005) noted the following:
Especially after the new Sinhalese constitution took effect in 1972, the
Tamil community has increasingly come to believe that the Sinhalese
government is deliberately pursuing policies that serve to stamp out core
attributes of Tamil national identity, and Buddhist religious goals are the
driving force behind this program. (p.140)
A religious asymmetry exists between Tamil and Sinhalese cultures. This
asymmetry has manifested itself by way of a conflict regarding control over a key
geographic area. Tamil land is of special interest to Buddhists. A popular
Sinhala-Buddhist belief maintains that Buddha personally created Sri Lanka and
visited parts of the land on three separate occasions (Pape, 2005, p. 147). One
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of these occasions involved a visit to Nagadipa, which is located in the Northern
section of the Jaffna Peninsula. Sinhala-Buddhist‟s subsequently bestowed
sacred significance upon this geographical area. Accordingly, religious
differences are precipitating factors behind much of the suicidal terrorist
operations conducted by the Tamil Tigers against the Sri Lankan government.
A comparative examination of a special situation will demonstrate the
importance of religious asymmetry within the context of Tamil conflict. Indian
peacekeeping forces were once deployed to Sri Lanka. These troops presented
a grave threat to the Tamil Tigers, carried out violent eradication operations, and
raped hundreds of Tamil women. “Torture, intimidation, and massacres were
common on both sides” (Baker, 1998, p. 160). “Although the Tamil Tigers carried
out suicide terrorist attacks against their Sinhalese opponents both before and
after the Indian intervention, there were no suicide attacks against the Indian
troops by the LTTE or any other group” (Pape, 2005, p. 151). Rather, they
employed standard guerilla warfare tactics. The absence of martyrdom
operations is attributed to the religious symmetry between Tamils and Indians.
Pape (2005) found the following:
While the Tamils (Hindu) fear that the Sinhalese (Buddhists) are seeking
to implement a religiously motivated program to transform the core
characteristics of their national community, the Tamils (Hindu) did not view
the Indian army (Hindu) as a religiously motivated occupier seeking to
transform their society- and that is the most likely reason why one case
led to suicide terrorism and the other did not.” (p.151)
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This case demonstrates that the presence of religious asymmetry, as opposed to
religious symmetry, within the context of an armed struggle is a precipitating
factor causally related to the establishment of suicidal terrorism.
A perceived threat to a cultural identity is also a precipitating factor leading
to the implementation of suicidal terrorism. Groups who feel they may fall victim
to a cultural annihilation will often develop extreme measures directed toward
cultural preservation. However, they must also believe that they can win.
Although religious affiliation is often a very large part of cultural identification, it is
not the sole criterion for the establishment of a cultural identity as a whole. Thus,
some terrorists seek to preserve their culture even outside of religious
considerations of their community. Two of the ten noted terrorist organizations,
Fatah and the PKK, fall within this category.
One special circumstance best frames the argument that a perceived
threat to a cultural identity is a precipitating factor that fosters suicidal terrorism.
A teenage Christian woman has secured legendary status within Palestinian
refugee camps. Loula Abboud was the first female Palestinian suicide bomber to
target Israeli Defense Forces. She also was the leader of a small militant group
who conducted operations against the Israeli occupation of Lebanon (Davis,
2004, p. 68). Abboud was a Christian living within a predominantly Muslim
community. She was not motivated by the religious asymmetry between Muslims
and Jews. Rather, she viewed the Israeli Defense Force as a threat to her
homeland. Her self-determination was rooted in the desire to act in accordance
with what she believed was in the best interest of the Palestinian community.
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Thus, the IDF presence was seen as a threat to the Palestinian culture.
Accordingly, the perceived threat to her cultural identity was a precipitating factor
leading to the performance of suicidal terrorism.
Fatah also seeks to preserve the cultural identity of the Palestinians by
establishing a secular state. Thus, from an institutional standpoint, they are not
employing religion as a primary justification for their actions. They argue that the
Palestinian people were unjustly fragmented and dislodged from their homeland.
They also maintain that the Palestinians are experiencing a humanitarian crisis
while exiled to refugee camps. Fatah is not exclusively interested in securing holy
land but simply land. Thus, the desire to preserve the Palestinian cultural identity
is also a precipitating factor leading to the performance of suicidal terrorism.
The PKK also lacks a religiously motivated agenda. Their traditional
Kurdish communities are comprised of both Sunni and Shiite Muslims. Unlike
most other suicidal terrorist groups, the PKK does not have widespread
grassroots support. This may have contributed to the low frequency, low
intensity, and low casualty-producing nature of the PKK suicide attacks. Pape
(2005) noted the following:
Although the PKK‟s suicide terrorism occurred while the Kurdish
homeland was under Turkish military occupation, the origins of the PKK‟s
suicide terrorism, more so than any other case, are most likely due to a
narrow commitment to the group‟s leader, Abdullah Ocalan. (p. 163)
While in prison, Ocalan called for his supporters to specifically conduct suicide
attacks in an effort to secure his release. Thus, the PKK‟s motivation for the
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suicidal component of their operations is rooted in a desire for cultural
preservation and personal loyalty to their leadership.
A perceived danger to a cultural identity is a precipitating factor leading to
the establishment of suicidal terrorism. Groups who believe they may fall victim
to a cultural obliteration will often develop intense reactions directed toward
safeguarding their cultural. Religious attachment is often a great part of cultural
identification but it is not the lone criteria for the establishment of a cultural
identity as a whole. Loula Abboud and terrorist organizations such as Fatah and
the PKK seek to defend their culture even outside of spiritual considerations.
Thus, independent of radical religious motivations, the notion of a looming
danger to a group‟s cultural identity is a precipitating factor leading to the
development of suicidal terrorism. The precipitating factors, noted within this
chapter, constitute block 3 of the triadic process that is accountable for the
decision of terrorist organizations to establish and sustain suicide operations.
The necessary causal factors include a desire for expulsion, perceived religious
asymmetry, and/or cultural threat. The precipitating factors are not individually or
collectively sufficient for the establishment of suicidal tactics. Two additional
factors must be present before martyrdom operations occur. These other factors
include socialization practices and an internal perception that the given terrorist
organization can win.
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Chapter 4: Socialization as Causation

Specific processes of socialization serve as dominant factors that are
causally responsible for the establishment of suicidal terrorism. These dominant
socialization factors constitute block 4 of the causal model for suicidal terrorism.
This chapter systematically describes how each of the top ten suicidal terrorist
organizations fit the criteria outlined in block 4. This chapter also provides a
reinforcing account of the effects of the socialization processes by way of
explaining the role of altruism. Socialization is a lifelong process of learning,
adaptation, and assimilation that directs individuals to behave in a manner
consistent with the expectations of a group of people. “It begins very early, and in
due course the child learns to take part in group life and to embody in some
degree the values of his society and of groups within it” (Broom & Selznick, 1970,
p. 84). Children are born into a pre-existing social system without an innate
knowledge of the mechanics of the given system. Newborns, for example, are
not born with knowledge regarding religion, nationality, or ethnicity. Knowledge
bases develop over time through specific socialization practices. Stated
differently, people are taught how and what to think, especially during childhood.
This chapter describes several key socialization mechanisms that give rise to the
practice of suicidal terrorism.
Many people are socialized into a particular religious group and behave in
accord with the expectations of the given religious component. Concepts
ingrained in radical Islamic philosophy foster a social environment conducive to
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suicidal terrorism or martyrdom operations from the standpoint of the perpetrator.
Not all suicidal attacks originate from radical Islamic beliefs. However, the role of
such beliefs cannot be ignored. Moreover, all suicidal terrorist attacks to date,
specifically directed toward the United States of America, have been carried out
by subscribers of militant Islamic fundamentalism. A brief overview of basic
Islamic beliefs and radical Islamic ideology will serve to build the basis for the
argument of socialization as a causal factor for suicidal terrorism.
Islam is a religion that combines elements of Christianity and Judaism. It
began in the year 610 when, according to believers, the Archangel Gabriel
contacted the prophet Muhammad and transmitted a divine message (Davis,
2004, p. 18). Muslims believe that Muhammad is the latest prophet of God.
“These revelations, conveyed by the angel Gabriel, are recorded in the Qur‟an”
(The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004, p. 49). “The Muslim creed consists of five
basic articles of faith: belief in one God, belief in angels, belief in the revealed
books, belief in the prophets, and belief in the day of judgment” (Haskins, 1973,
p. 144). Muhammad rapidly attracted followers and Islam sprang forward onto
the world scene with great momentum.
Muhammad‟s death was followed by a sharp split within Islam that
eventually set the stage for the integration of martyrdom ideology within the
religion. A portion of Muslims believed that a relative should have succeeded
Muhammad, while others maintained that a kinship succession was nonobligatory. “It was at this time that the two major sects of present-day Islam were
formed” (Haskins, 1973, p. 142). The Shiites steadfastly maintain that
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Muhammad‟s successor should always be established by kinship. Conversely,
the Sunnis believe that Muhammad‟s successor should always be established on
the basis of an election.
“Hussein ibn Ali, Muhammad‟s grandson, is known as the Master of
Martyrs, especially among the Shia” (Davis, 2004, p. 97). Hussein fought to
establish himself as the head of Islam. His failed endeavor directly resulted in the
embracement of martyrdom ideology. Islamic history maintains that Hussein was
severely tortured prior to his execution. More importantly, many Muslims believe
that he was tortured because of his adherence to Islamic values. “Whatever the
details, Hussein‟s death at Karbala split Muslims into two distinct sects, Sunni
and Shia, and set the standard of martyrdom in Islam” (Davis, 2004, p. 48).
The overwhelming majorities of Muslims maintain a peaceful existence,
respect other religions, and welcome diversity. However, minorities subscribe to
militant Islamic fundamentalism. This belief system demonizes many modern
governments and policies that, from an extremist perspective, have lead to a
decline in the world power brokered by the followers of Islam. The 9/11
Commission Report (2004) noted the following:
The extreme Islamist version of history blames the decline from Islam‟s
golden age on the rulers and people who turned away from the true path
of their religion, thereby leaving Islam vulnerable to encroaching foreign
powers eager to steal their land, wealth, and even their souls. (p. 50)
Such sentiments fuel the increasing trend of martyrdom. In fact, this ideology
manifests itself by way of specific socialization practices that encourage suicidal
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terrorist operations. A systematic presentation of key examples, across the
cultural spectrum, will enlighten the readers understanding about the nature and
mechanics of these socialization practices.
Little is known about the socialization processes of the Al-Qaeda terrorist
network. Gathering detailed cultural data is problematic, and would probably lead
the researcher astray, because al-Qaeda is not operating within a well-defined
geographical or cultural arena. Their network and recruitment base is not
exclusive to any particular region. Indeed, the identities of these terrorists are
shrouded in secrecy. It is problematic for even the best intelligence services to
gather data regarding their identity, personal history, and movements. The vast
majority of public knowledge regarding such members focuses on those who
have already died in suicide missions. What is known is that Al-Qaeda members
adopt a philosophy of radical Islamic fundamentalism. Adherence to this
philosophy mandates an intense hatred directed toward the United States and
Israel. Moreover, all religious systems are transmitted via socialization. Radical
Islamic fundamentalism is no exception. The necessarily social transmission of
this belief system constitutes a type of socialization. Its rationalization for
employing martyrdom serves to mentally prepare its members for suicidal
operations.
Many members of al-Qaeda have attended special training camps. Most
camps were located in Afghanistan. Mohammed Atta, a leader among the 9/11
hijackers, attended one of these camps during the late 1990‟s (Pape, 2005, p.
223). The purpose of these camps was to train recruits to conduct terrorist
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operations. Only devout Muslims were admitted (Pape, 2005, p. 223). These
training programs, like conventional military training, served to assimilate the
trainees into the group. Al-Qaeda hosted a special two-week course on radical
Islamic fundamentalist philosophies. “The purpose of the two weeks of religious
lectures was to ensure that the recruits had a common justification rooted in
Islam for the acts they were already intent on committing” (Pape, 2005, p. 223).
This course is a prime example of the social transmission of ideology favoring
martyrdom operations. Additional training, composing of 3 phases, focused on
combat skills. “In the first, lasting about a month, recruits were taught how to use
an impressive array of light weapons, such as pistols, sniper rifles, and machine
guns” (Pape, 2005, p. 224). The second phase, lasting about 2 weeks, taught
recruits how to employ conventional explosives and produce improvised
explosive devices. “The final several weeks were devoted to the use of heavier
weapons, such as mortars, grenade launchers, and anti-aircraft weapons” (Pape,
2005, p. 224). These terrorist-training camps taught recruits to justify and
perpetrate acts of violence against civilian targets. This type of training is an
example of the socialization processes that give rise to the establishment of
suicidal terrorism.
Black September, Hamas, and Fatah all operate under very similar
cultural and religious circumstances. They all desire to establish a Palestinian
state. Black September and Hamas subscribe to militant Islamic fundamentalism.
Fatah remains secular but is unquestionably influenced by Islam. Moreover, they
function largely within Palestinian refugee camps. These camps share a common
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culture. Examination of the socialization practices that are exclusive to such
camps will reveal a myriad of causal behaviors that give rise to the social
acceptance and perpetuation of martyrdom.
Children who live in Palestinian refugee camps are often socialized into
the role of a terrorist by means of exposure to television propaganda. They are
taught at an early age that they must participate in an armed struggle against
Israel. Many television shows, specifically designed for children, demonize Israel
and the United States. These shows are visually comparable to children‟s
television programming within the United States insofar as they employ attractive
colors, fuzzy characters, and the presence of children. One show has included a
character that appears strikingly similar to Mickey Mouse. However, the spoken
messages of these shows often encourage martyrdom and foster a social
acceptance for violence against Israel. Many Palestinians, to include children,
conceptualize death as something separate from martyrdom. They often describe
martyrdom, within the context of Jihad, (shahada) as sweet and beautiful. They
believe that they will immediately unite with Allah after the execution of a
martyrdom mission. Given the distraught lifestyle associated with refugee camps,
many Palestinians strive for an afterlife in paradise.
Terrorist training camps also provide young Palestinians with socialization
and indoctrination that is specifically directed toward violence. Munir al Makdah is
a militant leader who operates from a Palestinian refugee camp. He serves as a
figurehead for the Palestinian militancy against Israel and personally oversees
terrorist training camps. “In Ain al Helwah, there are no Boy Scout camps, sports
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clubs, or video arcades to command the attention of growing boys; so Al
Makdah‟s jihad camps fill the gap” (Davis, 2004, p. 148). These highly
clandestine camps teach children how to operate firearms, grenades, and other
weapons. More importantly, children learn that they must actively participate in
the violent struggle against the Israelis. These camps serve as a socialization
and indoctrination mechanism directed toward establishing suicidal terrorism as a
socially accepted means of opposition.
Palestinian refugee camps are inundated with propaganda campaigns
directed toward fueling hatred for Israel and the United States. Many mosques
blast anti-Zionist messages directed toward fostering hatred among the general
public. Children are especially susceptible to messages of hate. “All of them have
been raised singing praises of martyrs and believing that there is no nobler act
than to die fighting” (Davis, 2004, p. 154). Moreover, they are raised to believe
that they will immediately join with God upon completion of a martyrdom mission.
Such ideological sentiments are transmitted by way of religious and political
propaganda. These sentiments fuel the escalating fire that burns away all
inhibitions preventing the implementation of suicidal terrorism. Accordingly, such
propaganda campaigns serve as a socialization mechanism that gives rise to the
socially accepted philosophy that suicidal terrorist operations are fully warranted.
The Internet is playing an increasingly prominent role in the transmission
of terrorist propaganda. Palestinian terrorists often videotape suicide bombers
prior to their mission. They often make final statements that reference their
family, religious beliefs, and desire to combat the Israelis. Many of these videos
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are subsequently posted on the Internet. Many of these web sites include political
cartoons and written statements that demonize Israel and the United States.
They send a clear message that terrorist behavior is not only socially acceptable
but also favorable.
Students attending the Al Najah University once produced a highly
controversial propaganda display that served to glorify suicidal terrorism. “The
exhibit, designed to mark the first anniversary of the Palestinian intifada, featured
a recreation of the Sbarro bombing scene” (Davis, 2004, p. 132). The display
focused on an incident that occurred on August 9, 2001 when a young
Palestinian named Izzidene al Masri detonated a bomb inside the Sbarro
Pizzeria in Jerusalem. “Some students associated with Hamas even went as far
as to splatter fake blood and body parts around the room” (Davis, 2004, p. 132).
Such acts of propaganda serve to socialize Palestinians into adopting a mentality
that glorifies, encourages, and justifies suicidal terrorism.
The culture of Palestinian refugee camps specifically cultivates a special
and honorable social status for mothers of martyrs. Members of the community,
even the international community, often monetarily compensate them for the
services of their children who conduct suicidal terrorist operations. Many entities
are known to provide such compensation including the former government of
Saddam Hussein, individuals from the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabian
residents, King Abdullah, Hamas, the Palestinian Authority, and the Women‟s
Societal Welfare Fund (Davis, 2004, p. 124). Additionally, members of the
various Palestinian refugee camps often console and support mothers of martyrs.
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These practices are examples of socialization practices that give rise to the
social acceptance and perpetuation of suicidal terrorism.
“Suicide terrorist organizations commonly cultivate „sacrificial myths‟ that
include elaborate sets of symbols and rituals to mark an individual attacker‟s
death as a contribution to the nation” (Pape, 2005, p. 29). “The United States has
accused Iran of being a state sponsor of terrorism by sending money and arms to
support the Palestinians and for encouraging Palestinian youths to become
martyrs” (Davis, 2004, p. 62). Iranian Shiites practice a ritual known as the
Ashura ceremony. Women, dressed in black veiled clothing, carry out selfmutilation exercises in honor of the tortuous struggle endured by Hussein. Men
also participate in self-mutilation and many observers use chains to beat
themselves and draw blood. “Ashura morning sessions are regularly held in Iran
to remember Hussein‟s suffering and death and to promote the reverence of
martyrdom” (Davis, 2004, p. 49). These ceremonies are often held in public
places and thus exert influence within the public sphere. Members of the public,
especially children, learn of the importance of martyrdom via this socialization
practice and are thus inclined to behave in accordance to what they learned.
Shiite religious leaders, especially the late Ayatullah Ruhollah Khomeini,
encouraged these rituals. “Shias identify strongly with the death of Hussein, and
his martyrdom set the tone for everything that has happened since in their world”
(Davis, 2004, p. 49).
Martyrdom ideology is ingrained in many aspects of Iranian culture. This
ideology has served as a foundation for the establishment and moral justification
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of operations conducted by Hizballah. “Pictures of young men and many women
martyrs hang from lampposts or are plastered across walls in cities throughout
the country, and artists use public spaces to create memorials to those
proclaimed martyrs of Islam” (Davis, 2004, p. 46). Martyrs are granted a very
high social status after their death. “Streets and alleys are named in their honor,
and the country‟s religious leaders are careful to regularly pay homage to those
who died helping to create their Islamic republic” (Davis, 2004, p. 46). A plethora
of cemeteries specifically memorialize martyrs. The capital city even houses a
special museum for martyrs. “The long entrance hall to the Martyrs Museum in
Tehran is carpeted in blood red and a giant sign overhead proclaims: „In the
Name of God of Martyrs and the Honest‟” (Davis, 2004, p. 45). The transmission
and perpetuation of martyrdom ideology, especially within the public sphere,
accounts for a type of socialization. The totality of such socialization practices
results in the inclination for groups and individuals to serve as martyrs in the
future. Pape (2005) noted the following:
The more suicide terrorists justify their actions on the basis of religious or
ideological motives that match the beliefs of a broader national
community, the more the status of the terrorist martyrs is elevated, and the
more plausible it becomes that others will follow in their footsteps. (p. 28)
The Tamil Tigers also operate within a social system that gives rise to
martyrdom by way of socialization. “Numerous journalists and scholars who have
visited Jaffna report that the local population supports suicide operations and
commemorates LTTE martyrs” (Pape, 2005, p. 145). The LTTE has a very high
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degree of popular support from the Tamil community. The community itself feels
threatened by the encroachment of the Sri Lankan government and spread of
Buddhism. It is no surprise that the LTTE leader, Prabhakaran, uses public fear
as a means of fostering support and mobilizing suicidal terrorists. He and his
supporters often give public speeches that specifically justify their actions. “In
numerous speeches, Black Tiger operations are centrally linked to the common
welfare” (Pape, 2005, p. 144). The noted speeches and the pre-existing public
fear of cultural annihilation are forms of socialization that generate a social
environment that favors martyrdom operations.
Public speeches alone do not fully and causally account for the
establishment of suicidal terrorism by the Tamil Tigers. A plethora of socialization
practices, operating in unison, foster social acceptance for such actions. “Black
Tigers often have their own monuments, built near public spaces in Tamil towns”
(Pape, 2005, p. 144). An abundance of monuments, large and small, dot the
landscape and seek to venerate martyrdom. “These displays are conscious
efforts to cultivate broad public support for martyrdom” (Pape, 2005, p. 144). The
notion of imminent death is ingrained within the operational terrorists. “Moreover,
the Tamil Tigers require something no other major militant group has ever
required: that every member, male and female, wear a vial of cyanide, refreshed
every few months, on a leather thong around the neck” (Pape, 2005, p. 143).
They are instructed to kill themselves to avoid capture. Over six hundred
terrorists have committed suicide in this fashion (Pape, 2005, p. 143). They too
are considered martyrs from the perspective of their community. Wearing these
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suicide capsules is a form of socialization that serves to psychologically and
operationally prepare terrorists for death. They believe that they are serving a
higher cause and that their community will support their actions.
“Expectation of community support is a key reason so many individuals
are willing to commit suicide for the Tamil Tigers” (Pape, 2005, p. 143). In fact,
Tamil communities celebrate an annual holiday known as Heroes Day on July
5th. This holiday commemorates martyrs who died in an effort to gain
independence, expel unwanted entities, and thwart the encroachment of
Buddhism. “Those who carried out suicide attacks for the LTTE attached great
importance to how the community would interpret and remember their actions”
(Pape, 2005, p. 143). Accordingly, the terrorists often go to great lengths to
publicize acts of martyrdom. Individuals often carry a letter or special
identification card that serves to explain why they committed suicide in an
attempt to kill others (Pape, 2005, p. 143). This makes it easy for law
enforcement officials to clearly determine the attacker‟s identity and motivation.
Armed with such information, media outlets then distribute the facts to the public
(Pape, 2005, p. 143). The community then engages in exercises of praise and
glorification of the suicidal action. Such actions are forms of socialization that
encourage future operations.
The PKK membership is granted some degree of moral support from the
public. Sympathizers collectively stress the monumental importance of their
nationalist agenda. The PKK‟s martyr-specific socialization is grounded in the
nationalist social movement and not in religious beliefs. Community proponents
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of establishing a Kurdish state maintain that death is justifiable in pursuit of
independence. This concept is not uncommon within nationalist movements in
general. Most of the PKK‟s martyrs were longstanding members of their
organization, as opposed to being newly recruited volunteers. This suggests that
they had time to undergo prolonged indoctrination and assimilation into the
terrorist group and that they rationalized the use of suicidal attacks. PKK suicide
bombers have acted with the belief that they were serving a higher agenda.
Thus, their martyrdom missions are a direct reflection of the socially created
ideological principles that are transmitted via socialization.
The Shiite and Sunni Insurgencies of Iraq are a comparatively recent
phenomenon. They began during the United States invasion in 2003 and have
progressively expanded into lethal forces that employ suicidal tactics to kill their
enemies. These terrorist organizations did not exist under the rule of Saddam
Hussein but the socialization of insurgents occurred prior to the invasion. Sunni
and Shiite extremists maintained a dichotomized existence under Hussein.
However, they did not resort to high levels of mutual violence. This is due to the
strong authoritarian style of government headed by Hussein and ruthlessly
enforced by his designated agents. Stated differently, Sunni and Shiite extremists
could not establish opposing militias because the legitimate government would
have destroyed them. The U.S. invasion resulted in a power vacuum that left the
Iraqi socio-political field wide open. The Iraqi government lost the ability to
maintain control of the dichotomous tensions between Sunnis and Shiites. The
Sunni and Shiite extremists were able to develop well-armed militias and conduct
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terrorist operations against each other and strike coalition forces occupying their
country precisely because no one could legitimately stop them. Although the U.S.
invasion and occupation is a precipitating factor that ultimately set the stage for
the development of these insurgencies, the terrorists were socialized into their
role by way of the sharp religious divide between Sunni and Shiite Islam. The
socialization practices typical of radical Islamic fundamentalism are primarily but
not exclusively accountable for the establishment of these terrorist insurgencies.
The Chechen Rebels also operate from a radical Islamic fundamentalist
perspective. This belief system is necessarily transmitted by social interaction.
Social acceptance for martyrdom missions is common among the rebels. They
employ religion and nationalism to justify martyrdom. They typically operate in
small, highly cohesive groups. Several Chechen Rebel operations have
employed multiple family members. Terrorists with shared kinship committed
airline and subway bombings in August of 2004. The presence of kinship,
associated with suicide missions, suggests the perpetrators were socialized into
their role. The family serves as the chief transmission mechanism for the
diffusion of cultural principles (Merton, 1967, p. 158). Joint martyrdom among
family members indicates the presence of joint moral support. This type of
support is necessarily transmitted via socialization. The Chechen Rebels receive
martyrdom-specific socialization from their community, through active adherence
to radical Islamic fundamentalism, and from within their family.
Altruism is an effect of the noted socialization processes. Most suicidal
terrorists adopt an altruistic comportment regarding their martyrdom missions
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that is exclusive to their organization. The typical notion of altruism focuses on a
selfless comportment directed toward facilitating the overall welfare of others.
Some researchers may argue that suicidal terrorism is in no way facilitating the
overall welfare of humanity. This argument is valid from the perspective of the
victimized society. However, understanding the underlying motivation of suicidal
terrorists requires an examination from the perspective of the individuals
composing a terrorist organization that employs martyrdom tactics. These
terrorists operate from the personal belief that they are serving the overall
welfare of their organization. They further contend that their organization‟s
agenda serves the long-term interest of humanity. Thus, from an internal
perspective, suicidal terrorists adopt an altruistic comportment. Accordingly, the
argument for an internal altruistic comportment is paradoxically valid. The
altruistic comportment is a precondition for the overwhelming majority of suicidal
terrorist missions. “Suicide is the end result of a process, not the process itself”
(Beck, Resnik, & Lettieri, 1986, p. 4). The social process leading to suicide
deserves some attention.
A brief overview of suicide typologies will assist the reader in
understanding the peculiar relationship between altruism and suicidal terrorism.
Emile Durkheim (1897/1979) was a classical sociological theorist who pioneered
studies on suicide. He developed four particular types of suicide known as
egoistic, anomic, fatalistic, and altruistic (Durkheim, 1897/1979). These
typologies remain relevant to modern suicidal phenomena. Durkheim believed

54
that individuals must live within a state of equilibrium with their society.
Deviations from the equilibrium can result in suicidal behavior.
Egoistic suicide stems from a personal lack of social integration that can
disrupt the individual‟s equilibrium with society. Individuals who lack a suitable
amount of integration will feel as if they are not wholly a part of society. They feel
at odds with their given social situation. Unfavorable personal feelings, created
by a lack of integration, are causally related to acts of suicide. In fact, egoistic
suicide is the most common type. However this type rarely, if ever, is applicable
to martyrdom missions because such missions are executed for the benefit of a
social entity (Pape, 2005, p. 181). Particular communities, especially within
Palestinian refugee camps, wholly support many suicide missions. Support is
publicly manifested by way of celebratory praise, memorials, and financial
support to family members of suicide bombers. Mothers frequently and publicly
praise the acts of martyrdom perpetrated by their children. These circumstances
operate conversely from social reactions to egoistic suicide in which the
individual is often criticized for suicidal behavior, memorials are considered
taboo, and parental support is overwhelmingly nonexistent. “Publicity is rarely
sought and commonly shunned” (Pape, 2005, p. 177). Members of terrorist
organizations seek to glorify the suicides associated with martyrdom missions.
Thus, egoistic suicide is not predominantly associated with terrorism (Pape,
2005, p. 181).
Anomic suicide occurs when significant social events are substantially
disrupted. Sudden disruptions often result in a shift in the equilibrium between
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the individual and society. “These disruptions are likely to leave individuals
dissatisfied because there is little control over their passions, which are free to
run wild in an insatiable race for gratification” (Ritzer & Goodman, 2004, p. 177).
Individuals are socially influenced by major disruptions and are inclined to act
upon them. Suicidal acts are usually generated by an unhealthy and dependent
personal connection with the event that was disrupted. Suicides associated with
dramatic changes in the stock market are best categorized as anomic. This
variation of suicide may partially account for some martyrdom missions that were
motivated, at least in part, by a desire to seek the gratification associated with
revenge. Some Tamil women became suicide bombers after Indian military
forces killed their family, raided their village, and gang raped them (Pape, 2005,
p. 226). These events surely constitute a sudden and dramatic disruption to daily
life. However, subsequent martyrdom missions also occurred as part of a welldefined campaign directed toward a common good from the perception of the
perpetrator. This consideration suggests that Durkheim‟s suicide typologies are
not necessarily mutually exclusive. However, anomic suicide is not the
overwhelming type applicable to the majority of martyrdom missions. Anomic
suicide, at best, accounts for only a small portion of the motivation behind the
totality of suicidal terrorist attacks.
Fatalistic suicide occurs in situations involving acts of significant social
oppression and/or excessive regulation. Some people choose to commit suicide
because they have absolutely no hope for the future insofar as the root cause for
losing hope stems from societal regulation. In such situations, suicide may be
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viewed as a better alternative than the oppression, especially if the nature of the
oppression involves torture. Slaves who killed themselves because they did not
wish to endure the hardships of slavery best exemplify fatalistic suicide.
Durkheim viewed fatalistic suicide as comparatively unimportant to the other
types because few cases existed. This typology may apply to terrorists who kill
themselves to avoid capture but it does not apply to martyrs who kill themselves
as a means to kill others. Suicidal terrorism is not fatalistic because the
perpetrators have not lost hope for a suitable future. Rather, they commit suicidal
terrorism precisely because they want future changes to occur in favor of their
organizational goals. Thus, fatalistic suicide is not associated with martyrdom
operations.
“Many acts of suicide terrorism are a murderous form of what Durkheim
called altruistic suicide” (Pape, 2005, p. 179). This type of suicide operates
conversely from the egoistic model. In this case, individuals may feel
overshadowed by social institutions or society at large. In essence, an individual
can become too integrated and buckle under social pressure. Over-integration
results in the disruption of equilibrium between the individual and society. The
social nature of suicidal terrorist attacks is causally related to the over-integration
of the attackers. Martyrs commit suicide because they believe they are serving a
higher purpose. “All these cases have for their root the same state of altruism
which is equally the cause of what might be called heroic suicide” (Durkheim,
1979, p. 240). However, the standards that foster a perception of serving a
higher purpose are unavoidably socially determined. Thus, when society exerts
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too much pressure on individuals, they can become over-integrated and prone to
commit altruistic suicide.
Altruistic suicide is the primary type applicable to suicidal terrorism. “Many
suicide terrorists are acting on the basis of motives fundamentally different from
those that underlie ordinary suicide and would probably not commit suicide
absent the special circumstances that created these motives” (Pape, 2005, p.
172). Suicidal terrorism is primarily a tactic of maximizing damage to a perceived
enemy for the benefit of the perpetrators organization and/or supporting
community. “Numerous suicidal terrorists are acting at least partly to serve their
community‟s interest in fighting the national enemy” (Pape, 2005, p. 173). A
supreme notion of duty to an organization or community is apparent in most
cases of martyrdom. Terrorists truly believe they are acting in line with a greater
cause that is beneficial to their community. Specific situations of socialization,
especially glorification and overt encouragement, causally account for this
perception. “In such situations, society can exert pressure on the individual to
make personal sacrifices, including the sacrifice of one‟s life, for purely collective
goals” (Pape, 2005, p. 174).
The establishment of teamwork within the context of suicide operations
bolsters the argument that suicidal terrorism is best characterized as altruistic
(Pape, 2005, p. 186). Al-Qaeda, Tamil Tigers, and the Chechen Rebels
frequently deploy suicidal terrorists in teams. Individuals rarely perpetrate suicidal
attacks alone. “In fact, many suicide attacks involve multiple individuals working
together for weeks, sometimes even months, to gather intelligence, plan, and
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rehearse a joint mission” (Pape, 2005, p. 185). They virtually always have a
supporting network of terrorists who construct explosives, reconnoiter targets,
plan missions, and assist with logistics. Additionally, many suicide operations
coordinate the use of more than one suicide bomber when conducting attacks.
This notion of teamwork is contrary to normal egoistic suicides in which
individuals commit the act in great privacy if not outright humility. “The
prevalence of team suicide attacks strongly indicates the presence of altruistic
motives among a significant number of suicide attackers” (Pape, 2005, p. 186).
Given that a minority of suicide bombers are somewhat motivated by anomie, the
notion is overshadowed by altruism. Pape (2005) noted the following:
Even if all suicide attackers had some personal motive to die, suicide
attackers who work together as a team must also be motivated, at least
partly, to achieve a collective purpose, the completion of a group mission
that serves a cause beyond their own personal death. (p. 186)
This chapter has demonstrated that the top ten terrorist organizations, that
employ suicidal tactics, categorically undergo specific socialization processes
that favor the establishment of martyrdom as a legitimate means of combating
their enemy(s). Block 4 of the causal model for suicidal terrorism maintains that
these socialization practices are a necessary precondition for establishing
suicidal tactics. This chapter further concludes that the adoption of an altruistic
comportment, exclusive to the given terrorist organizations, is a direct result of
the noted socialization processes. The adoption of this particular type of altruism
demonstrates that the decision to perpetrate suicidal terrorism is not an a priori
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judgment. Rather, martyr-specific socialization occurs first and the described
altruistic comportment is a proximal result. In consideration of these findings, it is
a safe assertion to maintain that the top ten suicidal terrorist organizations must
undergo specific socialization processes that favor the establishment of
martyrdom as a legitimate means of combating their enemy(s), before such
tactics are socially accepted and subsequently implemented by any given
terrorist organization.
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Chapter 5: Perceived Strategic Feasibility

“The previous generation thought the Cold War might bring the end of
creation, but the West now faces a determined, disciplined, and persistent enemy
that is not only willing to die, but cherishes death as a path to martyrdom” (Davis,
2004, p. 217). The perpetrators of suicidal terrorist attacks are operating under a
perception of positive tactical feasibility insofar as they believe they are capable
of winning. “They are prepared to fight for generations, and are convinced that
they ultimately will win” (Davis, 2004, p. 216). This attitude is a necessary
precondition for the establishment of suicidal terrorist tactics as outlined in block
5 of the causal model. This chapter seeks to provide a basic account explaining
how the top ten suicidal terrorist organizations specifically believe they can
achieve their goals.
The tactic of using suicide-type operations to inflict damage on an enemy
is an adaptation to a very specific scenario. Subnational and militarily weaker
forces usually direct such attacks toward democratic nations with superior
military capabilities (Pape, 2005, p. 44). “In suicide terrorism, the coercer is the
weaker actor and the target is the stronger” (Pape, 2005, p. 30). Terrorists view
democracies as being particularly vulnerable to attacks in terms of a target
government‟s potential to provide concessions. The United States, Israel, Sri
Lanka, France, Britain, and Turkey have been consistently targeted by suicidal
terrorist operations. These democratic governments theoretically establish
foreign policies on the basis of popular desires manifested by way of votes.
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Terrorists believe that inflicting damage and generating fear within a democracies
public arena will lead to voters mandating a change in policy commensurate with
the wishes of the terrorist organization. Suicidal terrorist organizations specifically
target democratic nations because they believe they have a better chance of
winning.
Suicidal terrorists have not systematically targeted other types of
governments such as dictatorships, authoritarian regimes, and communist
systems. This is largely due to a perception of tactical infeasibility. Terrorists
believe that these types of governments would be more inclined to inflict
catastrophic damage on the perpetrating suicidal groups. “The Kurds, who
straddle Turkey and Iraq, illustrate the point that suicide terrorist campaigns are
more likely to be targeted against democracies than authoritarian regimes”
(Pape, 2005, p. 45). The Kurdish terrorist organization, known as PKK, has
conducted systematic suicidal terrorist operations in Turkey. They are a MarxistLeninist association whose agenda is to establish an independent Kurdish state.
“Although Iraq has been far more brutal toward its Kurdish population than has
Turkey, violent Kurdish groups have used suicide attacks exclusively against
democratic Turkey and not against the authoritarian regime in Iraq” (Pape, 2005,
p. 45). This is attributed to the late Saddam Hussein‟s ability to inflict
uninterrupted genocidal damage on Kurdish populations within Iraq. The Iraqi
citizens would have been powerless to stop their government‟s actions.
Moreover, Hussein frequently targeted Kurds for assassination and mass
execution to the extent of employing his military forces to use weapons of mass
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destruction against them. Accordingly, the PKK was deterred from launching
terrorist operations within Iraq. This situation best illustrates that non-democratic
nations are not systematically targeted by suicidal terrorist campaigns largely
because the ability to win or gain concessions is diminished.
Suicidal terrorism allows perpetrators to tactically maximize their
destructive capability. “An attacker who is willing to die is much more likely to
accomplish the mission and cause maximum damage to the target” (Pape, 2005,
p. 28). A lone attacker can easily conceal explosive material on his or her body
without attracting undue attention. Moreover, lone attackers are capable of
altering their plans as needed to maximize damage. “They are also better able to
infiltrate heavily guarded targets, because they do not need escape plans or
rescue teams” (Pape, 2005, p. 28). Suicidal terrorist tactics are often aimed at
nations that boast a superior military. The tactical significance of suicidal
terrorism is that terrorists maximize damage to their enemy while minimizing
damage to their organization. Essentially, suicidal tactics can cause more
damage with little strain on the terrorist organization. These operational tactics
are directed toward winning in terms of mission success and prompting
concession.
“At its core, suicide terrorism is a strategy of coercion, a means to compel
a target government to change policy” (Pape, 2005, p. 27). Radical Islamic
terrorists, for example, desire the U.S. to withdraw all military forces from the
Middle East and abandon support for Israel. Unable to achieve their goals by way
of conventional means, they resort to suicidal operations directed toward
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spawning official concessions. “Targets may be economic or political, military or
civilian, but in all cases the main task is less to destroy the specific targets than
to convince the opposing society that it is vulnerable to more attacks in the
future” (Pape, 2005, p. 30). This accounts for why symbolic targets are often
chosen. Suicidal terrorist desire to maximize their influence on the society
targeted. They believe that such influence will bring about concessions and/or
policy changes that will best serve the interests of the terrorist organization.
Unfortunately, terrorist organizations have some valid historical
foundations for believing that suicidal tactics will lead to concessions. Many
terrorist organizations have the perception that several governments have
yielded to demands that were made while employing suicidal terrorism strategies.
Suicide attacks conducted by Hizballah prompted the United States to withdraw
from Lebanon in 1983. The Sri Lankan government agreed to participate in
sovereignty negotiations with the Tamil Tigers after the group conducted a
barrage of suicide operations. The Israelis have historically released prisoners in
an effort to appease radical Islamic fundamentalist terrorist organizations that
employed suicidal assault tactics. The targeted governmental bodies may or may
not define their responses as concessions. The critical point is that terrorist
organizations believe that the noted examples are concessions. This leads to a
perception within terrorist groups that they can win.
“The American and French withdrawal from Lebanon was perhaps the
most clear-cut coercive success for suicidal terrorism” (Pape, 2005, p. 65).
Military components of the United States, France, and Britain participated in
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peacekeeping missions within Lebanon in 1983. The presence of these troops
outraged the radical Islamic fundamentalist community. Several terrorist
organizations believed that the military presence constituted an occupation and
facilitated the interest of their common enemy (Israel). These circumstances
prompted Hizballah to conduct suicidal bombing missions against U.S. and
French forces on October 23, 1983. A suicidal terrorist drove an automobile,
equipped with explosives, into a U.S. Marine facility in Beirut. The attack resulted
in the death of hundreds of Marines. A second suicidal truck bomber drove into a
French military facility and detonated his explosives. Over 50 French soldiers
were killed. United States, French, and British forces were subsequently
withdrawn from the country. President Ronald Reagan expressed overwhelming
support for the withdrawal citing the large cost of American lives. “This move was
seen by many Islamic militants as proof that the use of terrorism would succeed”
(Mattox, 2004, p. 110).
The Tamil Tigers have conducted multiple suicide missions and
conventional attacks against the Sri Lankan government. Their primary goal is to
establish a sovereign state within parts of Sri Lanka. The group‟s leader,
Vellupillai Prabhakaran, has stressed the coercive effectiveness of suicidal
operations. “Prabhakaran was especially impressed by Hezbollah‟s 1983 suicide
attack against the U.S. Marine barracks in Lebanon and concluded that the same
tactic could be employed to compel the Sri Lankan government to accept Tamil
independence” (Pape, 2005, p. 73). His assessment was partly valid insofar as
the Sri Lankan government conducted official negotiations with the terrorist group
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in 1993, 1994, and 2001(Pape, 2005, p. 65). These negotiations were specifically
directed toward exploring the possibility of actually establishing a separate state
for supporters of the Tamil Tiger separatist movement. The establishment of
these official negotiations was viewed as a victory for the Tamil Tigers. They
realized that suicidal terrorism could effectively force governmental concessions.
The Israeli government has historically organized prisoner releases on the
basis of attempting to pacify terrorist groups who are known to conduct suicidal
operations. Israeli Defense Forces also withdrew from Lebanon in 1985 partly as
a result of ongoing suicidal terrorist operations. “Palestinian terrorist groups were
also encouraged by their assessments of the success of Hezbollah‟s coercive
efforts to believe that suicide terrorism would be an effective way of coercing
Israel” (Pape, 2005, p. 73). These actions are perceived as significant
concessions.
The noted concessions served to bolster the terrorist resolve, generate a
perception of positive tactical feasibility, and embolden a new generation of
attackers. Terrorists believe they can and will achieve victory. They are not
operating under conditions of complete irrationality or madness. Rather, these
groups see themselves as effective brokers of their agenda who are waging
organized campaigns against target governments. A single disgruntled individual
rarely perpetrates suicidal terrorism. Most suicidal terrorist attacks involve
meticulous strategic planning at the organizational level. Most attackers are
aided by well-established support systems. These conditions lead groups to
adopt a positive outlook regarding the tactical feasibility of suicidal operations.
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The Bush Administration has developed and unwaveringly maintained an
ironclad policy of refusing to give concessions to terrorists. “In principle and in the
abstract, the refusal to give in to terrorist demands has overwhelming appeal
because it is a more virile response than negotiating with terrorists” (Snow, 2007,
p. 281). This philosophy developed, in part, because terrorist groups were
emboldened by formerly extracted concessions. The strategic concept of the
Bush Administration‟s policy is directed toward discouraging future attacks by
eliminating any possibility for a change in policy corresponding to the desires of
terrorists. According to advocates of Bush‟s policy, terrorists may begin to believe
that the U.S. will not yield to their demands and consequently cease their attacks.
Each of the top ten terrorist organizations, that employ suicidal tactics,
believes they can eventually emerge victorious. All of them are particularly
emboldened by the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Lebanon in 1985. All
of the noted organizations categorically believe they are capable of winning the
campaigns they are waging. The perception of an optimistic tactical feasibility is a
necessary precondition for the establishment of suicidal terrorism. This
precondition is outlined in block 5 of the causal model for suicidal terrorism and
constitutes part of the triadic causal process.
Members of al- Qaeda believe victory is not only achievable but also
mandated via divine intervention. This belief is central to much of the militant
Islamic fundamentalist philosophy. Usama Bin Laden vocalized his attitudes
toward winning in an interview prior to September 11, 2001. “Citing the Soviet
army‟s withdrawal from Afghanistan, as proof that a ragged army of dedicated
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Muslims could overcome a superpower, he told the interviewer: „We are certain
that we shall – with the grace of Allah – prevail over the Americans‟” (The 9/11
Commission Report, 2004, p. 48). Given the Bush Administration‟s failure to
concede to their demands, they now largely view the U.S. as a hard target in
terms of coercing a military withdrawal from the Middle East. This fact was
manifested by an official al-Qaeda web publication in 2003. Pape (2005) noted
the following:
The forty-two-page document assumed that new spectacular attacks
directly against the United States would be insufficient to compel
America‟s withdrawal, and so it would be more effective to attack
America‟s European allies, who could be coerced to withdraw their forces,
thus increasing the economic and other burdens that the United States
would have to shoulder in order to continue the occupations of
Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Arabian peninsula. (p. 55)
Given this new strategy, al-Qaeda maintains a philosophy that victory is
achievable. They specifically targeted Spain with the contention that terrorist
strikes would provoke a withdrawal of Spanish military forces. It was believed
that the Spanish withdrawal would greatly influence Britain to also withdrawal
their military forces. “These strikes did occur and Spain did withdraw its forces
from Iraq, just as the document predicted” (Pape, 2005, p. 57). British Prime
Minister Tony Blair subsequently succumbed to the British population‟s mass
disapproval for the war in Iraq and withdrew a substantial number of military
forces. Al-Qaeda views these withdrawals as positive concessions. These
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concessions fuel their perception that they can win. Accordingly, al-Qaeda fits the
criteria specified in block 5 of the causal model for suicidal terrorism.
The case of the perception of an achievable victory for Black September
hinges of two factors. First, they are encouraged by Israeli concessions in
general. Second, they are also encouraged by the precepts outlined by hardcore
militant Islamic fundamentalism. The Black September organization has
historically been emboldened by concessions from the Israeli government,
especially toward similar terrorist organizations. The extraction of one terrorist
organization‟s concession can have a dramatic effect on similar organizations.
The Israeli government‟s prisoner releases have spawned a type of legitimacy for
terrorists that, in the absence of such releases, would not occur. The Israeli
government‟s willingness to concede to terrorists gives the terrorists a sense of
legitimacy. The very act of negotiating with the legitimate political wings of
terrorist organizations opens the possibility of extracting a concession. Thus,
many Palestinian terrorist groups, to include Black September, believe they can
win given Israel‟s track record of releasing prisoners and engaging in diplomacy
with legitimate political wings of terrorist organizations that publicly claim to
distance themselves from violent activity. The group‟s adherence to hardcore
militant Islamic fundamentalist principles mandates that an eventual victory will
be achieved. They believe they are engaged in a divine struggle in which they
will, by divine decree, emerge victorious. Accordingly, the Black September
terrorist organization fits block 5 of the causal model of suicidal terrorism.
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The Chechen Rebels, like many other suicidal terrorist organizations,
rationalize their actions by means of employing philosophies outlined by radical
Islamic fundamentalism. They believe they are fighting a holy war against
infidels. This rationalization provokes members to believe that a victory is
supported by divine order. The collapse of the Soviet Union has served to bolster
the group‟s resolve. They view the collapse as a favorable event because it
weakened Moscow‟s control over the Chechen region. This loss of control
strengthens the potential for the Chechen nationalist agenda. Given the group‟s
rationalization, combined with an improved potential to achieve statehood, they
adopt a winning philosophy. This philosophy is commensurate with the
precondition noted in block 5.
Fatah remains motivated and very much dedicated to establishing a
Palestinian state. They enjoy popular support from the Palestinian refugee
communities. Fatah sympathizers number in the thousands. This large support
base fosters a perception that they can achieve victory. Continued material
support and funding from entities abroad suggest they will not cease operations
anytime in the foreseeable future. Consequently, Fatah fits block 5 of the causal
model of suicidal terrorism.
Hamas mirrors Fatah in terms of widespread public support within
Palestinian camps. This terrorist organization has in excess of 20,000
sympathizers and/or supporters. Winning elections in 2006 encouraged the
Hamas leadership and the organization has subsequently gained momentum.
Their newfound status as a legitimate political entity serves to validate their
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pursuit of nationalist goals. Given the overwhelming Palestinian support and
political energy, the Hamas membership maintains a perception that victory is
possible. This perception is commensurate with block 5 of the causal model for
suicidal terrorism.
Hizballah remains an emboldened terrorist organization that has
influenced the tactics of other organizations. They are well known for their 1983
suicide attack on United States and French facilities in Beirut, Lebanon. The
United States withdrew its peacekeeping forces as a direct result of this terrorist
incident. This withdrawal was viewed as a major concession and many terrorists
adopted similar strategies. This concession was a major victory for Hizballah.
They believe they have in the past and will in the future achieve their goals.
These beliefs fit the criteria outlined in block 5 of the model.
The PKK has gained momentum following the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq.
They have begun to regroup, continue violent terrorist activities in Turkey, and
use areas in Northern Iraq as a safe haven. The political turmoil and inherent
governmental instability within Iraq has resulted in the perception that
establishing a Kurdish state is now more feasible than ever. Members of the PKK
encourage the fragmentation of Iraq insofar as a Kurdish state emerges. Their
increase in momentum, combined with a very real possibility for the
fragmentation of Iraq, suggests they are operating from a perception they can
indeed achieve a nationalist goal. Accordingly, this organization meets the
criteria specified in block 5 of the causal model.
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The Shiite Insurgency of Iraq maintains a philosophy that they can win. A
Shiite Insurgency victory would include securing political power and driving
foreign military forces out of the country. Much of their actions are fueled by
sectarian tensions. Members of the Shiite Insurgency support an uprising that will
ensure economic and political superiority for Shiites. They believe they can win
by taking advantage of the general instability and outright weakness of the Iraqi
government. Moreover, they employ an interpretation of religious principles to
justify their actions and create a perception that victory is in the hands of a divine
entity. They believe they are capable of ousting foreign military forces, especially
from the United States, by sustaining a massive casualty-producing campaign.
They do not expect to kill all American forces but they believe they can kill
enough to provoke a withdrawal. They intend to sway American public opinion in
a direction that will result in a governmental withdrawal. In consideration of their
rationalization and tactics, it is safe to maintain that they believe victory is
achievable. The Shiite Insurgency of Iraq is fitting with block 5 of the causal
model.
The Sunni Insurgency of Iraq also maintains a belief they can win. A Sunni
Insurgency victory would incorporate securing political control and removing
foreign military forces from the country. Sectarian tensions drive much of their
actions. Sunni Insurgents support a revolt that will guarantee financial and
political dominance for Sunnis. They trust that they will achieve victory by
exacerbating Iraq‟s instability. Additionally, they make use of an interpretation of
religious values to rationalize their campaign and invoke a perception that victory
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is supported by their religion. Sunni Insurgents believe that they can prompt a
withdraw of foreign military forces, particularly from the United States, by
continuing a campaign of terror. They believe they can cause enough damage to
incite a departure of foreign forces. They specifically intend to influence the
opinion of American voters in a way that will result in the demand for a wholesale
military departure from Iraq. In light of their rationalization and strategy it is easy
to conclude that they believe they can achieve victory. Accordingly, the Sunni
Insurgency fits block 5 of the causal model of suicidal terrorism.
The Tamil Tigers perception of achievable victory is rooted in the massive
grassroots support for their agenda and a history of extracting governmental
concessions. The overwhelming Tamil support for nationalism fuels the
momentum of this terrorist organization. They are unwilling to abandon their
cause and will undoubtedly continue their campaign in the foreseeable future.
The organization‟s leadership has specifically stated they have adopted suicidal
tactics in an effort to expedite the establishment of a Tamil state. They believe
that the use of martyrdom and coercion will lead to victory. The Tamil Tigers are
encouraged by concessions. For example, the Sri Lankan government has
engaged in a series of negotiations with the Tamil Tigers that were directed
toward exploring the possibility of founding a state (Pape, 2005, p. 65). These
negotiations helped fuel the group‟s momentum and belief that their nationalist
goal is achievable. Accordingly, they fit the causal factor represented by block 5
of the model.
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A belief in achievable victory is a necessary, but not singularly sufficient,
precondition for the establishment of suicidal terrorism. This factor is outlined in
block 5 of the causal model. This chapter has demonstrated that members of the
ten noted suicidal terrorist organizations believe they can accomplish their goals.
Their perception of achievable victory is largely the product of historic
concessions and religious beliefs.
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Chapter 6: Comparative Analysis

Proving the validity of the causal model for suicidal terrorism mandates a
comparative analysis between terrorist organizations that employ suicidal tactics
and terrorist organizations that do not. The presented model hinges on the triadic
process that leads to the implementation of suicidal tactics. The triadic process is
composed of blocks 3, 4, and 5 of the model. The factors described in each block
of the triadic process must be present before terrorists resort to martyrdom.
Failure to meet any piece of the triadic process will result in a failure of the
terrorist organization to employ tactics involving martyrdom. Block 3 refers to
explicit precipitating factors that include a desire for expulsion, a perceived
religious asymmetry, and/or a perceived cultural threat. Block 4 encompasses
the socialization specifically directed toward fostering a social acceptance for
martyrdom. Block 5 refers to the institution of a perception that the terrorists can
ultimately win and that suicidal tactics are worth the inherent costs. Chapters 3,
4, and 5 have demonstrated that suicidal terrorist organizations follow the causal
model via adherence to the triadic process. This chapter‟s analysis will focus on
five major terrorist organizations that do not employ suicidal tactics. The terrorist
organizations selected for examination include Aum Shinrikyo, Basque
Fatherland and Liberty, Irish Republican Army, Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Columbia, and Shining Path. Examining these five organizations will reveal that
they do not fit the causal model.
Aum Shinrikyo is the most recognized terrorist organization in Japan. “A
cult established in 1987 by Shoko Asahara, the Aum aimed to take over Japan
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and then the world” (Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001, 2002, p. 90). The cult
practiced a bizarre combination of Buddhism, Hinduism, apocalyptic nihilism, and
mysticism that was, according to believers, directly transmitted to the founder via
divine intervention. The organization was successfully able to recruit a global
following that peaked in the thousands during the mid 1990‟s. “Approved as a
religious entity in 1989 under Japanese law, the group ran candidates in a
Japanese parliamentary election in 1990” (Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001,
2002, p. 90). All Aum Shinrikyo candidates failed to win elections. This failure
exacerbated an already intense hatred toward the Japanese government. “Over
time, the cult began to emphasize the imminence of the end of the world and
stated that the United States would initiate Armageddon by starting world war III
with Japan” (Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001, 2002, p. 90). The group began to
recruit a central membership consisting of individuals who were well educated in
the sciences. They began to develop an exclusive weapons of mass destruction
program that focused on chemical warfare. It was during this time that the group
underwent a restructuring process directed toward mirroring the Japanese
government. It was believed that the new organizational structure would prove
beneficial should the legitimate government collapse. Having successfully
developed an arsenal of chemical weapons, the terrorist organization launched
various attacks throughout Japan. “On 20 March 1995, Aum members
simultaneously released the chemical nerve agent sarin on several Tokyo
subway trains, killing 12 persons and injuring up to 6,000” (Patterns of Global
Terrorism 2001, 2002, p. 90). Subsequent investigations by Japanese authorities
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revealed the extent to which the cult had developed into a terrorist organization.
In consideration of the cult‟s terrorist nature, the Japanese government rescinded
the official classification as a religious organization in 1995. However, the
membership was officially allowed to continue religious practices under intense
governmental and public scrutiny beginning in 1997. Aum Shinrikyo continues to
practice their brand of religion today. “Under the leadership of Fumihiro Joyu the
Aum changed its name to Aleph in January 2000 and claimed to have rejected
the violent and apocalyptic teachings of its founder” (Patterns of Global Terrorism
2001, 2002, p. 90). However, the group is strongly suspected of gathering
sensitive intelligence regarding nuclear technology in 2000. Additionally,
components of the group‟s Russian membership were suspected of planning a
series of coordinated assaults against targets associated with Japanese
childcare facilities. Accordingly, the cult remains under governmental surveillance
and U.S. authorities assume the organization presents a threat to American
security.
Aum Shinrikyo follows blocks 3 and 5, but deviates from block 4, of the
causal model for suicidal terrorism. Blocks 3, 4, and 5 constitute a triadic process
of causation. Block 3 requires the presence of precipitating factors to include a
desire for expulsion, perceived religious asymmetry, and/or a perceived cultural
threat. This organization desired to expel the legitimate Japanese government
and secure supreme control over the country. They were operating from religious
asymmetry in that any other religious institution was inferior from the group‟s
perspective because they defined themselves as brokers of the supreme truth.
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Although the organization is in its infancy in terms of establishing itself as a
cultural entity, they have experienced a cultural threat by the governmental
revocation of an official classification as a religious institution. Block 5 requires
the organization to believe that they are capable of achieving victory. The
organization not only believed that they could win but they believed that it was
their divine destiny to take over the world.
The factors described in blocks 3 and 5 were clearly present for Aum
Shinrikyo but the factors described in block 4 were not. Aum Shinrikyo has never
launched a suicidal terrorist attack. However, they have launched several nonsuicidal terrorist attacks that targeted civilians traveling on the subway,
residential neighborhoods, an office building, and judicial authorities. The failure
to specifically adopt suicidal tactics is attributed to a deviation from block 4 of the
causal model for suicidal terrorism. Block 4 constitutes a central component of
the triadic causal process leading to martyrdom operations. This block maintains
that the members of terrorist organizations must experience specific socialization
processes conducive to the social acceptance of suicidal terrorism. This is not
the case with members of Aum Shinrikyo. In fact, the embracement of martyrdom
ideology is contrary to much of the organizations philosophy. The cult‟s
apocalyptic teachings focus on survival. Membership in this cult has been
comparatively low considering that the group only consisted of several thousand
members during its peak. Moreover, only a very small central core of the group
was operationally responsible for terrorist acts. Accordingly, the strong desire for
survival trumped the establishment of suicidal tactics because every individual
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member was a highly valued asset. An additional factor preventing the
establishment of socialization favoring martyrdom was time. The cult emerged
suddenly in 1987 as a direct result of intense recruiting measures carried out by
a charismatic leader. The groups‟ philosophy and grievance was not rooted in a
historically established social movement, as is the case with the terrorist
organizations that have adopted suicidal tactics. Stated differently, the cult did
not have enough time to establish socialization patters favoring martyrdom. The
factors represented by block 4 of the causal model for suicidal terrorism were
absent. This absence accounts for the terrorist organizations failure to adopt
suicidal tactics.
The terrorist organization known as Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)
is one of the most recognized within Europe. It was “founded in 1959 with the aim
of establishing an independent homeland based on Marxist principles in the
southern Spanish Provinces of Vizcaya, Guipuzoca, Alava, and Navarra and the
southwestern French Departments of Labourd, Basse-Navarra, and Soule”
(Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001, 2002, p. 91). ETA is an umbrella
organization with a well-organized and sophisticated structure composed of
several smaller factions pursuing the same agenda. “The ETA regularly targets
Spanish Government officials, members of the military and security forces, and
moderate Basques for assassination” (The Vice President‟s Task Force on
Combatting Terrorism, 2002, p. 36). ETA routinely conducts armed assaults
utilizing small arms and remote detonated bombings. The nature of their
bombings is unusual, for a terrorist organization, because they typically contact
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authorities in advance and state when and where a bombing will occur. This
tactic focuses on property damage and minimizes the loss of innocent life
because the authorities are often able to evacuate a threatened area. However,
this scenario is not always the case. Basque Fatherland and Liberty has
unquestionably targeted innocent people and is responsible for the deaths of
numerous civilians. ETA declared a permanent cease-fire in 2006 but
subsequently exploded a car bomb in a Madrid airport terminal. Two members of
the organization perished in the explosion. It is not known if they intended to die
during the explosion or not. Thus, this singular incident may or may not constitute
an act of suicidal terrorism. Nonetheless, the Basque Fatherland and Liberty
movement is not historically associated with a protracted campaign of suicidal
terrorism. They certainly have not developed an overall strategy of employing
suicide as part of a means to kill others.
The Basque Fatherland and Liberty organization follows blocks 3 and 5,
but deviates from block 4 of the causal model for suicidal terrorism. Blocks 3, 4,
and 5 represent a triadic course of causation. Block 3 necessitates the presence
of precipitating factors to include a desire for expulsion, perceived religious
asymmetry, and/or a perceived cultural threat. ETA desires to expel French and
Spanish authorities from defined regions within both states and establish an
independent nation. Moreover, they also perceive a cultural threat. This threat is
best manifested by the cultural encroachment of France and Spain within the
Basque regions. ETA viewed the Spanish Parliamentary decision of 2002, which
rendered their political wing (Batasuna) illegitimate, as an act of cultural
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oppression. Block 5 requires the member of an organization to believe they are
capable of winning. ETA has demonstrated that they clearly believe that they can
win. “The ETA is one of the oldest Western European terrorist groups currently
operating” (The Vice President‟s Task Force on Combatting Terrorism, 2002, p.
36). Given their long track record, they must believe that their efforts are
worthwhile. If they believed otherwise, they would have disbanded long ago. This
evidence supports the contention that factors described within blocks 3 and 5 are
present. However, ETA lacks established socialization practices that directly
embrace martyrdom.
The Basque Fatherland and Liberty organization seems to place a higher
overall value on human life, in general, than any other major terrorist
organization. This value is manifested in their general willingness to warn
authorities of upcoming bombings as a means to minimize civilian casualties.
Moreover, they are very discriminate with their attacks insofar as they specifically
target governmental entities and key individuals who pose a substantial threat to
their organization. These tactics suggest they place a higher value on human life
when compared to terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda and Hizballah, which
indiscriminately attack civilians without warning. These facts indicate that ETA
lacks an altruistic comportment exclusive to their organization. On the contrary,
ETA seems to have adopted a more generalized altruistic comportment favoring
the perpetuation of human life in general even outside of their organization. By
way of comparison, al-Qaeda and Hizballah have developed an exclusively
internalized altruistic comportment manifested by way of indiscriminately killing
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innocent people for the greater good of their organization. ETA, however,
extends their altruistic comportment outside of their organization. The chief
manifestation of this extension is displayed by way of issuing warnings for
imminent bombings. In consideration of these facts, it is apparent that ETA fails
to conform to block 4 of the triadic process constituting the chief causal factors
leading to the establishment of a suicidal terrorism campaign.
The Irish Republican Army (IRA) was formed in 1969 as a secretive armed
branch of the legitimate Sinn Fein movement. Their chief objective is to expel
British forces from Northern Ireland, create a Marxist state, and promote Roman
Catholic religiosity. The Vice President‟s Task Force on Combatting Terrorism
(2002) noted the following:
Since Northern Ireland separated from the Irish Republic when the latter
gained its independents in 1921, the Roman Catholic minority in Northern
Ireland has protested discrimination by the Protestant controlled
Government and has agitated for unification in both violent and nonviolent
campaigns. (p. 56)
The modern IRA is likely composed of operational members numbering in the
hundreds and sympathizers numbering in the thousands. “Its traditional activities
have included bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, punishment beatings,
extortion, smuggling, and robbery” (Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001, 2002, p.
121). This terrorist organization is not known to employ suicidal tactics. The IRA
has historically received funding and material support from Libya. Some U.S.
citizens are suspected of generating funding for the organization. The Irish
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Republican Army has recently agreed to cease violent activity and pursue their
goals through peaceful means to the extent that they have signed a formal
agreement with governmental officials and conducted limited disarmament.
However, the group retains the potential to conduct future terrorist attacks.
The Irish Republican Army meets the criteria specified in block 3 of the
causal model for suicidal terrorism but fails to adhere to the criteria outlined in
blocks 4 and 5. Block 3 is composed of precipitating factors such as a desire for
expulsion and a perceived religious asymmetry. The IRA strongly desired to
expel British forces from Northern Ireland. They constitute a Roman Catholic
religious minority and believed the Protestant majority has oppressed them. This
situation is fitting of the standards for a perceived religious asymmetry. Thus, the
organization fits block 3 of the model. Block 4 requires the members of terrorist
organizations to experience specific socialization favoring martyrdom. The IRA
membership lacks this specific type of socialization. In fact, their socialization
operates in contrast with practices favoring martyrdom largely because of the
profound suicide taboo associated with Roman Catholicism. Thus, the
organization deviates from block 4 of the model. Block 5 stipulates the
organization must believe they are capable of achieving victory. This terrorist
organization initially believed they were capable of achieving their goals.
However, after several decades of violence and a failure to achieve
governmental concessions, they decreased the intensity of their violence in
pursuit of a more peaceful means of advancing their goals. The organization
experienced a turning point in 1998 when they officially declared an end to
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casualty-producing violence. This turning point was a manifestation of a new
organizational philosophy that maintained that victory was not achievable through
violence. Accordingly, the factor represented by block 5 is not applicable to the
IRA. The Irish Republican Army‟s failure to adopt suicidal tactics is attributed to a
deviation from blocks 4 and 5 of the causal model for suicidal terrorism.
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) are the most well
known terrorist organization in South America. They are composed of
approximately 10,000 operational terrorists. “Established in 1964 as the military
wing of the Colombian Communist Party, the FARC is Colombia‟s oldest, largest,
most capable, and best-equipped Marxist insurgency” (Patterns of Global
Terrorism 2001, 2002, p. 107). Their primary goals are to establish a communist
government in Colombia and eliminate U.S. influence in the region. They
primarily generate funding from robbery, kidnapping, extortion, and drug
trafficking. “The FARC has a closer relationship with Colombian narcotics
traffickers than do other Colombian insurgent groups” (The Vice President‟s Task
Force on Combatting Terrorism, 2002, p. 103). They frequently target tourists
including U.S. citizens for kidnapping and subsequent acquisition of ransoms.
They employ non-suicidal terrorist tactics in their endeavor to achieve victory.
The organizational philosophy of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Columbia adheres to block 5, of the causal model for suicidal terrorism, but fails
to encompass the factors described in blocks 3 and 4. Block 5 mandates that the
terrorist organization must believe they can achieve success. This organization‟s
positive philosophy of attainable concessions is manifested in their commitment,
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growth, and continuation of terrorist actions directed toward establishing a
Marxist state. Given the longevity of the organization, they would have likely
abandoned their cause if they believed their actions were not worthwhile.
Accordingly, they reasonably fit the criteria outlined in block 5. Block 3 maintains
that the desires for expulsion and/or perceived religious asymmetry are
necessary preconditions for establishing suicidal terrorist tactics. The FARC
certainly desires to expel the democratic government of Colombia and U.S.
influence from the region. However, they are not operating from a substantial
perception of religious asymmetry. Their operations are predominantly exclusive
to Columbia. The overwhelming majority of Colombians practice Catholicism.
Thus, they are not actively engaged in a conflict with a societal entity boasting a
differing religious stance. Accordingly, their organization fails to meet the
complete criteria for block 3 of the causal model for suicidal terrorism because
the model mandates that both a desire for expulsion and a religious asymmetry
must be present to constitute a precipitation of ideology directed toward
embracing martyrdom operations. Block 4 of the triadic process of causation
stipulates that terrorists must undergo specific socialization directed toward
embracing suicidal tactics. These particular socialization practices do not occur
within Colombian society. The lack of socialization supporting martyrdom is likely
attributed to the Catholic taboo associated with suicide. Accordingly, the FARC
fails to encompass the factor represented by block 4. The Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Columbia‟s failure to engage in suicidal terrorism is attributed to a
deviation from blocks 3 and 4 of the presented model of causation.
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“The Shining Path is a highly active and violent terrorist/insurgent group
that claims a neo-Maoist orientation” (The Vice President‟s Task Force on
Combatting Terrorism, 2002, p. 106). This organization was founded by
university professor Abimael Guzman in 1969 and began to launch violent
terrorist operations beginning in 1980. The group‟s native name is Sendero
Luminoso and is often abbreviated as SL. Their overall goal is to evoke a
proletariat uprising to overthrow the government and establish a communist
state. The Shining Path membership is primarily operational within rural areas.
They identify strongly with native Peruvian beliefs to the extent that they often
mutilate their victims in a way consistent with native principles. “This feature of
the SL operations is partly a reflection of an Indian belief that an unmutilated
victim‟s spirit can reveal its killer, and it also magnifies the terror effect of the
killings” (The Vice President‟s Task Force on Combatting Terrorism, 2002, p.
108). They are exclusively active within Peru and typically target governmental
officials, foreigners, and Peruvian citizens who oppose their organization. They
are directly responsible for attacks on the United States, Soviet, and Indian
embassies during the 1980‟s. The organization was composed of roughly 10,000
members during its peak. However, recent arrests and governmental
counterterrorism strategies have greatly reduced the group‟s membership and
operational capability. The current membership numbers in the low to mid
hundreds. They generate funding largely through drug trafficking, extortion, and
robbery. They have not conducted suicidal terrorist operations.

86
The organizational philosophy of the Shining Path adheres to block 3 of
the causal model for suicidal terrorism but fails to encompass the factors
described in blocks 4 and 5. Block 3 specifies that terrorist organizations must
experience precipitating factors to include a desire for expulsion and a perceived
religious asymmetry/cultural threat as a precondition for establishing suicidal
tactics. They fervently desire to expel the Peruvian government in an effort to
establish a Marxist society. They also operate from a low intensity religious
asymmetry/cultural threat. Religious asymmetry is apparent within the context of
native beliefs. It is manifested by way of ritualistic mutation running contrary to
Catholicism which is the primary religion associated with Peru. The religious
strife was especially apparent considering the groups terrorist acts against
Christian entities. The Shining Path set a Christian church ablaze in August of
1984. They also stole food from a church in February of 1986 and threatened to
execute a priest. A diminutive cultural threat is present due to the encroachment
and/or expansion of modern Peruvian society into rural areas. Accordingly, the
Shining Path meets the criteria described in block 3 of the causal model for
suicidal terrorism. However, the criteria outlined within blocks 4 and 5 are not
applicable to this particular terrorist organization. Block 4 requires terrorists to
experience specific socialization directed toward establishing social acceptance
for martyrdom. No such socialization occurs in Peru. Most of the urban
population practices Catholicism, therefore, Peruvian society at large maintains a
strong suicide taboo. The criteria noted in block 4 of the causal model for suicidal
terrorism is not applicable to the Peruvian terrorists associated with the Shining
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Path. Block 5 maintains that the members of terrorist organizations must believe
they can win before they resort to suicidal tactics. Although the Shining Path was
once a strong and determined organization consisting of thousands of members,
recent events have eroded much of the group‟s capabilities and morale. Most
notably, Abimael Guzman was captured and imprisoned in 1992 and quickly
called for a ceasefire. The Shining Path moderately observed his request and
subsequently began to fragment. The organizations loss of key leadership,
extensive counterterrorism operations, and a sharp decline in membership
suggests that the organization is on the verge of collapsing. In consideration of
these facts, the organizational membership likely maintains a very low level of
optimism. Thus, the Shining Path fails to meet the criteria specified in block 5 of
the causal model for suicidal terrorism. Their failure to adopt suicidal terrorist
tactics is attributed to the deviation from blocks 4 and 5 of the model.
Testing the validity of the causal model for suicidal terrorism required an
analysis of terrorist organizations that do not use suicidal tactics. The presented
model focuses on the triadic process that leads to the implementation of suicidal
tactics. The triadic process constitutes blocks 3, 4, and 5 of the model. The
factors described in each block of the triadic process must exist before terrorists
resort to conducting suicide missions. The absence of any factor of the triadic
process will result in a failure of the terrorist organization to make use of tactics
involving martyrdom. Block 3 refers to specific precipitating factors such as a
desire for expulsion, a perceived religious asymmetry, and/or a perceived cultural
threat. Block 4 encompasses socialization practices purposely directed toward
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encouragement and social acceptance for martyrdom. Block 5 refers to the
presence of a perception that the terrorists can eventually win. This chapter‟s
analysis focused on five high-profile terrorist organizations that do not employ
suicidal tactics. None of the examined organizations adhere to the complete
criteria outlined by the triadic process of causation because each of the noted
terrorist organizations deviated from at least one block of the model. All of the
examined organizations deviated from block 4. This uniform deviation suggests
that socialization is the most dominant factor within the triadic process.
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Chapter 7: Conclusions

This research project examines the sociological factors that give rise to
suicidal terrorism. These factors constitute a 6-block model of causation. Block 1
represents the process by which a social entity develops a grievance against a
government. Block 2 represents the social entity‟s decision to form a terrorist
organization. Much of this project examines the factors that causally account for
an organizations decision to employ suicidal tactics. Terrorist organizations follow
a triadic process that causally accounts for the implementation of suicidal tactics.
The triadic process consists of blocks 3, 4, and 5. The factors outlined in each
stage of the triadic process must be manifested in concert before terrorist
organizations make use of suicidal tactics. Failure to meet any part of the triadic
process will result in a failure to adopt suicidal tactics. Block 3 refers to specific
precipitating factors that include a desire for expulsion, a perceived religious
asymmetry, and/or a perceived cultural threat. Block 4 represents the specific
kinds of socialization practices that lead to martyrdom. Block 5 refers to the
institution of an internal group notion that the terrorists can win. Block 6
represents the actual adoption of suicidal terrorist tactics. Figure 1 visually
illustrated the model of causation.
Ten terrorist organizations, known to employ suicidal tactics, were
selected for this study. The overwhelming majority of suicidal terrorist attacks are
attributed to these ten organizations. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 confirmed the
presence of factors outlined by the triadic process of causation. None of the
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examined terrorist organizations known to employ suicidal tactics deviate from
any part of the model.
Chapter 3 showed that key factors serve to precipitate the terrorist
organizations decision to implement suicidal tactics. Terrorist organizations must
experience two key precipitating factors as a precondition for implementing
suicidal tactics. First, the membership must desire to expel a social entity from a
defined geographic area. Second, the membership must perceive that their
religious beliefs are asymmetrically aligned with the entity that they desire to
expel or that the entity poses a substantial cultural threat to the terrorist‟s
community. Each of the examined terrorist organizations, known to employ
suicidal tactics, experienced the two key precipitating factors outlined in block 3
of the triadic causal process.
Chapter 4 demonstrated that members of the selected organizations, as
well as many community members at large, undergo specific socialization that
encourages martyrdom. Primary examples of this type of socialization include
sacrificial myths, glorification, public praise of suicide operations, and overt
parental admiration of offspring who carried out suicidal missions. The social
characteristics reflected by the members of the 10 terrorist organizations fit the
criteria outlined in block 4.
Chapter 5 revealed that the ten examined organizations, which employ
suicidal tactics, believe they can achieve victory. An organizational philosophy
encompassing this belief is a necessary precondition for establishing suicidal
tactics. Many terrorist organizations are emboldened by historic concessions.
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Several terrorist organizations believe victory is mandated through a divine order
as interpreted by subscribers to radical Islamic fundamentalism. This study
systematically confirmed that the members constituting each of the ten noted
terrorist organizations believe they can win. The causal criterion outlined in block
5 of the triadic process exists within all of the examined terrorist organizations
employing suicidal tactics.
Testing the validity of the causal model required an analysis of terrorist
organizations that do not employ suicidal tactics. Chapter 6 examined five major
terrorist organizations of this nature. Each of the five organizations deviated from
at least one part of the triadic process. The factor of socialization (block 4) was
uniformly absent within the context of terrorist organizations not employing
suicidal tactics. These discoveries lend credibility to the causal model for suicidal
terrorism.
This study found that 3 factors causally account for the establishment of
suicidal tactics within the context of terrorism. First, the members of terrorist
organizations must desire an expulsion and operate from a perceived religious
asymmetry or cultural threat. Second, terrorists must experience socialization
conducive to martyrdom. Third, terrorists must believe they can win. This trio of
factors, manifested in concert, causally accounts for the implementation of
suicidal tactics by terrorist organizations.
Pape (2005) concluded, “that national resistance to a foreign occupation,
a democratic political system in the occupying power, and a religious difference
between the occupied and occupying societies are the main causal factors

92
leading to the rise of suicide terrorist campaigns” (p. 126). The conclusions of this
study are very similar to Pape‟s conclusions. However, several key differences
exist. Pape focused on nationalism as the primary causal factor for suicidal
terrorism (Pape, 2005, p. 101). This body of work concludes that socialization is
the most important causal factor. Nationalism is a product of socialization. Thus,
socialization is a more proximal cause than nationalism. However, socialization
as a singular factor is not sufficient. Terrorist organizations must also be exposed
to precipitating factors (block 3) and they must believe they can win before they
decide to conduct martyrdom operations.
Given a positive identification of the primary causes of suicidal terrorism, it
is important to examine theoretical strategies directed toward eliminating this
phenomenon. This body of work has made use of a block system. Each block
represents specific causal factors that give rise to an organization‟s decision to
perpetrate suicidal terrorism. Eliminating suicidal terrorism can be accomplished
by systematically eliminating, or decreasing the magnitude of, the underlying
factors described in each block.
Two major strategies for suppression, antiterrorism and counterterrorism
tactics, account for governmental efforts to eradicate, thwart, undermine, or
prevent terrorist activity. “Antiterrorism refers to defensive efforts to reduce the
vulnerability of targets to terrorist attacks and to lessen the effects of terrorist
attacks that do occur” (Snow, 2007, p. 295). An example of an antiterrorism tactic
is the use of barricades around federal buildings. The barricades can create a
perception among terrorists that a facility is a hard target. Barricades can also
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minimize the effectiveness of a car bomb by denying a vehicle the ability to come
within close proximity to a facility. “The other form of terrorist suppression is
counterterrorism, offensive and military measures against terrorists or sponsoring
agencies to prevent, deter, or respond to terrorist acts” (Snow, 2007, p. 296).
Counterterrorism efforts seek to directly combat individual terrorists and terrorist
organizations. An example, of a counterterrorism tactic, is an air strike on an
operational terrorist training facility. Antiterrorism and counterterrorism tactics will
continue to play a critical role in suppressing terrorism. An additional strategy,
proposed in this body of work, is to manipulate aspects of social life in a manner
that will eliminate or reduce the causal factors that produce suicidal terrorism.
Block 1 refers to a social entity that establishes grievances against a
government. The establishment of grievances is a precondition for establishing a
terrorist organization. Common grievances include disapproval of a governmental
system, dissent regarding the distribution of wealth, a desire to establish a new
state, a desire to expel an unwanted group, and a perceived cultural threat. The
latter two factors serve to precipitate a group‟s willingness to conduct martyrdom
missions after they have established a terrorist organization. Brokering good
governmental policies can minimize the intensity of such grievances. Many
groups favor one type of government over another. Several terrorist
organizations desire for capitalist governments to adopt Marxist systems. They
do not simply desire to adopt Marxism for the sake of Marxism. Rather, they
believe that a shift in a government‟s typology will benefit the proletariat. This
perspective requires a grievance rooted in the welfare of the proletariat. Many of
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these types of grievances focus on a massively unequal distribution of wealth
within a capitalist society. For example, a select few individuals possess large
amounts of capital and live lavish lifestyles while a large amount of other people
are very poor and barely manage to subsist within the context of a capitalist
society. The primary grievance, against capitalism, is rooted in the extreme
monetary dichotomy between classes. Capitalist governments can minimize such
grievances by encouraging a less polarized distribution of wealth and expanding
the middle class. Providing food and basic health care, to citizens who are
incapable of generating enough capital to subsist, would go a long way to
minimize the socialist grievances against capitalism. Many groups desire to
establish their own separate country. Nationalist movements usually involve
grassroots support and a well-defined cultural group. Their nationalist desires are
often the product of perceived or actual suppression by another cultural group or
governmental entity. This type of grievance can be minimized, in some cases, by
granting autonomy or enhancing the conditions of an existing autonomy.
Governments can also encourage disgruntled ethnic/cultural groups by
promoting the transmission of peaceful cultural practices such as fine arts.
Specific governmental programs can expand the transmission of such arts to the
extent that the disgruntled ethnic/cultural entities may feel more included in a
given social system. These types of actions, occurring in unison, can minimize
the intensity of key grievances represented by Block 1 of the causal model for
suicidal terrorism. Peacefully reducing the magnitude of these kinds of
grievances will help prevent the establishment of terrorist organizations.
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Block 2 refers to the point in which a group establishes a terrorist
organization. Not every terrorist organization will employ suicidal tactics.
However, history has demonstrated that terrorist organizations are capable of
causing mass destruction by means of a plethora of tactics. The national security
of the United States, and other nations, is clearly threatened by terrorism. This
threat should be jointly combated by vigilant multinational cooperation, military
action, and law enforcement. Counterterrorism and antiterrorism strategies will
play a vital role in undermining terrorist activities.
Tracking terrorist organizations is of paramount importance. Several
different nations often secretly hold critical pieces to a grand puzzle of terrorist
activity. Members of the United Nations should participate in sharing intelligence
information regarding terrorism. Such intelligence should specifically include
information regarding the operational plans, capabilities, and movements of
known terrorists. Sharing key information, in a cooperative manner, can lead to a
heightened sense of mutual respect between countries. The act of sharing
intelligence could be viewed as a peaceful, respectful, and productive
international gesture. The information itself could easily save lives.
Military action is also a key feature of combating terrorists. However, it
must be employed properly because the consequences of misuse can easily
outweigh the benefits. The United States has adopted a policy of denying safe
haven to terrorists. This policy is wholly warranted and has demonstrated
effectiveness within Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda currently lacks the ability to operate
overt large-scale terrorist training camps within Afghanistan. The U.S. military

96
should continue to seek and destroy terrorists throughout the world. However,
most military actions against terrorists should make use of a minimum amount of
military personnel and employ covert actions. A small number of highly elite
military units are extraordinarily well equipped, trained, and operationally capable
of seeking and destroying most foreign terrorist organizations. These assets
should be quietly employed instead of massive invasions by conventional forces.
The misuse of military force can create monumental problems related to
terrorism and regional stability. “If Islamic militants needed another reason to
hate the United States, they found it on March 20, 2003, when American planes
began bombing Baghdad” (Davis, 2004, p. 204). President George W. Bush and
his narrowing band of supporters have caused a major crisis in the Middle East
by launching the unwarranted invasion of Iraq. The initial justification, as noted by
the President, was rooted in a strategic need to eradicate weapons of mass
destruction. The invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq resulted in the
official U.S. governmental judgment that such weapons were non-existent during
the onset of the military action. This strategic blunder is causally responsible for a
monumental loss of life, large-scale emergence of terrorism, refugee crisis, civil
war, regional instability, and an unnecessary expenditure of trillions of dollars.
Given the consequences associated with deploying large amounts of United
States military personnel to the region, future strategies should rely on vastly
smaller elite strike forces that can achieve rapid results when specifically
combating terrorists. Moreover, American citizens should never accept a war
policy without examining supporting evidence or lack thereof. United States
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military action within Iraq is seen as an act of conquest by much of the Muslim
world. “And it is not just militant Islamists who hold this view; rather, people all
over the Muslim world are expressing such thoughts” (Davis, 2004, p. 119). It
matters not if the perception is accurate. If a substantial group of Muslims believe
that the U.S. is operating as imperialistic conquers, then they will act in accord
with their beliefs. The U.S. involvement in Iraq is causally responsible for the
emergence of disruptive social actors manifested by way of the Sunni
insurgency, Shiite insurgency, and al-Qaeda in Iraq. The United States can avoid
much of the perception of imperialism by withdrawing most military personnel
from Iraq and steadfastly avoiding any unnecessary large-scale military action
abroad. United States foreign policy should focus on eliminating the perception of
imperialism because avoiding such perceptions will help quell terrorist
sentiments.
Law enforcement agencies of all countries have an inherent responsibility
to thwart terrorist activities within their particular areas of operation. These
agencies should develop specific units directed toward counterterrorism
activities. Moreover, law enforcement entities should model the post 9/11
examples, set by the United States, in which intelligence is shared between
governmental agencies. The shared information can better facilitate a
comprehensive identification of operational threats and serve to counter such
threats. Law enforcement agencies should work together to oppose the threat of
terrorism.
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Block 3 of the causal model for suicidal terrorism encompasses
precipitating factors. These factors include a desire for expulsion, perceived
religious asymmetry, and/or a perceived cultural threat. The implementation of
carefully crafted strategies can eliminate, or minimize the magnitude of, these
factors.
The desire for expulsion is a very important factor that is causally related
to the emergence of terrorist groups in general and suicidal terrorism in
particular. Many terrorist organizations seek to expel military forces from
geographic areas they consider sacred or native. Al-Qaeda, for example, wishes
to expel United States military personnel from the Middle East. The United States
can minimize the magnitude of this key grievance by substantially decreasing the
numbers of troops in the region. The presence of over 100,000 United States
military personnel, within Iraq, has exacerbated al-Qaeda‟s desire for expulsion
to the extent that they now recruiting a vast array of militant organizations that
carry out terrorist operations against the U.S. The results of efforts in Iraq differ
sharply from results in Afghanistan. Much of the success in Afghanistan is
attributed to the largely covert actions of the United States Special Forces,
Central Intelligence Agency, and other elite entities. Elite soldiers, armed with an
understanding of the host culture, often operate in very small groups. They
frequently secure the trust and cooperation from tribal entities to the extent of
conducting joint operations with a host culture component. This strategy
minimizes the amount of military forces on the ground and minimizes the desire
for expulsion. Moreover, most Special Forces operators conduct missions while
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fully clad in local civilian attire. This strategy minimizes the host nation‟s
perception of the presence of foreign military activity. The lack of outright
awareness of a military presence prevents groups from desiring to expel the
forces. Special Forces tactics are minimally intrusive and maximally effective.
These types of tactics should be employed in Iraq instead of conventional military
activity involving large numbers of conventional military personnel. Removing the
overwhelming majority of military personnel from Iraq will greatly reduce the
magnitude of the grievance associated with a desire for expulsion. The inherent
danger of this course of action is that a withdrawal could easily become viewed
as a concession to terrorists. Thus, any substantial withdrawal should be
accompanied by a massive propaganda campaign directed toward fostering a
public perception of victory throughout the world community. This type of
propaganda campaign could, in effect, serve as a damage control mechanism.
Conventional U.S. military forces have recently started to employ civilian
anthropologists and social scientists in an attempt to develop better relations
between host nation entities and military personnel. These academic
contributors, combined with military personnel, are known as Human Terrain
Teams. They focus on understanding the subtleties of host cultures and
brokering good relations. This strategy is proving effective, especially in
Afghanistan, although it is also being implemented in Iraq. Commanders have
reported a decrease in combat activity and they directly attribute the decrease to
actions involving the Human Terrain Teams. Fostering a better working
relationship between military forces and host nations will help eliminate or reduce
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the grievances associated with block 3 of the causal model. Using Human
Terrain Teams is an excellent short-term strategy. However, an overall reduction
in troop levels will likely demonstrate greater long-term effectiveness.
The perception of religious asymmetry is another important factor that is
causally related to the materialization of terrorist organizations in general and
suicidal terrorism in particular. Many religious extremists, particularly among
subscribers to radical Islamic fundamentalist beliefs, foster a dichotomist
philosophy insofar as any given person is either for or against a particular set of
radical beliefs. This dichotomous belief system is very much a matter of
perception. Terrorists define their situational comportment as dichotomous and
live with the consequences of their definition. “The initial definition of the situation
which has set the circle in motion must be abandoned” (Merton, 1967, p. 424).
Persuading terrorists to abandon their definition of the situation will be a very
long and difficult task. Encouraging tolerance, diversity, liberalism, and
multiculturalism can gradually minimize the extent of such dichotomous beliefs.
Moderate Muslims can help the situation by discouraging radical behavior and
launching an intellectual campaign directed toward promoting peaceful resolution
to conflict.
Block 4 of the causal model for suicidal terrorism accounts for specific
socialization mechanisms that give rise to the establishment of martyrdom.
These mechanisms also serve to legitimize suicidal terrorism and render such
behavior socially acceptable. Eliminating the socialization mechanisms will
require a substantial change in the host cultures that exhibit the noted forms of
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socialization. Governments and citizens who perpetuate such mechanisms must
undergo a radical change in perception that is directed toward establishing
peace. Although cultural changes are necessary, they will be monumentally
difficult to implement. An overt strategy, directed toward fundamentally changing
a culture, can easily be perceived as a threat to the host culture. Thus, highly
clandestine and secretive strategies should be employed to circumvent or
minimize a perception of a cultural threat.
A plethora of martyrdom-friendly socialization mechanisms occur via
electronic media. Many terrorist organizations operate web pages that seek to
recruit members, glorify martyrdom, and rally support for future terrorist activity.
Television programming, particularly brokered by Palestinians and al-Jazeera, is
a significant transmission mechanism for socialization. Many individuals are
influenced and emboldened by the last words of suicide bombers and speeches
by figures such as Usama bin Laden. Many governmental intelligence agencies,
especially those serving the United States and Israel, have the capability to
sabotage the electronic transmission of terrorist propaganda. These agencies
should employ highly clandestine and subversive tactics to electronically infiltrate
and render these media sources inoperable. Such tactics should remain highly
classified as to eliminate or minimize the host culture‟s perception of aggression.
A significant clandestine campaign, directed toward denying terrorists the
opportunity to transmit propaganda that serves to socialize individuals into
adopting suicidal tactics, will reduce the magnitude of the causal factor outlined
in block 4.
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A portion of the monetary funding, associated with the survival of
Palestinian television programming, comes from international aid. The reduction
or elimination of such funding would have a dramatic effect on their ability to
sustain media operations. International aid organizations should substantially
reduce or eliminate monetary assistance directed toward Palestinians. The
reduction of capital could be offset by providing material aide in the form of food,
medical supplies, and other staples of humanitarian relief. The reduction, or
outright elimination, of capital would reduce or eliminate their ability to transmit
terrorist propaganda. This, in turn, will eliminate a portion of the socialization
associated with the glorification and social acceptance of suicidal terrorism.
External actions to radically change the socialization mechanisms of host
cultures can only reduce the problem. It is imperative for the culture(s) in
question to internally implement changes directed toward eliminating the
socialization mechanisms associated with the glorification and social acceptance
of suicidal terrorism. Other governments can encourage productive behavior but
the host culture(s) will have the final decision in the matter. Accordingly, peaceful
encouragement and cross-cultural transmission can provoke host cultures to
internally decide to abandon violent terrorist activities.
The best tools for provoking meaningful changes are education,
employment, and communication. Education serves as a critical socialization
practice. Children are heavily influenced by their educational systems. Many
educational systems within problem areas are under-funded, substandard, or
even non-existent. International aid can help facilitate better systems, with the
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requirement that any funded system must promote peace and specifically
discourage terrorist friendly socialization. The international community can also
improve the situation by promoting programs directed toward relief services and
transmission of multicultural ideas.
The globalization of communication, tempered by clandestine efforts to
thwart terrorist communications, can serve to reduce terrorist sentiments by way
of cross-cultural transmission. Such transmission was limited, in previous
centuries, to human contact and physical dissemination of literary material.
Modern technology, combined with increased literacy, has resulted in the ability
to transmit cultural ideas on a global scale. The receivers of cross-cultural
transmission often make use of the television, Internet, telephones, and radio.
The exposure to outside influences can open the door for alternative ways of
thought. Many members of terrorist organizations especially within historical
Palestine, Pakistan, and Afghanistan receive a one sided account of history
through propaganda. A dramatic exposure to other perspectives could sway
public opinion, in the noted areas, toward adopting perspectives commensurate
with establishing peaceful resolutions to conflict. Accordingly, governmental
agencies should develop programs directed toward transmitting messages
associated with peace and nonviolent conflict resolution.
Block 5 of the causal model for suicidal terrorism refers to terrorist
organizations adopting a perception of achievable victory. A large reason for why
they believe winning is possible is rooted in historic concessions. Failing to grant
concessions and reducing the magnitude of any perceived concession can
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significantly undermine this causal factor. The United States and other world
powers should jointly deny concessions to terrorist organizations. All nations
should refuse to negotiate with terrorists, deny terrorist motivated prisoner
releases, and respond to terrorist attacks with shattering force. These actions
can deny terrorist organizations coercive power and diminish their internal
perception of authority. Some actions, despite the best of efforts, will be viewed
as concessions. Propaganda campaigns can help diminish the perception of
concessions relative to governmental actions.
This body of research has presented a causal model for suicidal terrorism.
Terrorist organizations follow a triadic process that accounts for their decision to
employ suicidal tactics. This causal process (outlined in Figure 1) focuses on
blocks 3, 4, and 5. The factors outlined in each block are necessary and
sufficient for causation when occurring in unison. Block 3 refers to explicit
precipitating factors that include a desire for expulsion, a perceived religious
asymmetry, and/or a perceived cultural threat. Block 4 represents the presence
of specific socialization practices that directly glorify martyrdom and render it
socially acceptable within the context of a terrorist community. Block 5 refers to
the establishment of an internal group perception that they can achieve victory.
Suicidal terrorism can be substantially reduced or eliminated by undermining the
causal factors. Future strategic objectives should include a considerable
decrease in the number of United States military personnel operating in the
Middle East, amplified dependence on elite counterterrorism assets, vigilant
antiterrorism measures, and sabotaging the transmission of terrorist propaganda.
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Appendix: Selected Chronology of Suicidal Terrorist Attacks

This appendix seeks to inform the reader of the history and scope of
suicidal attacks throughout the world. The chronology begins in 1906 and ends in
2007. This list is in no way exhaustive, however, it is a representation of notable
suicidal attacks and includes key historical events that served to shape the
perspectives and policies regarding terrorism. Understanding the history and
scope of suicidal terrorism will better enable the reader to develop solutions for
one of the greatest problems facing global security.
August 25, 1906: A terrorist incident occurred in St. Petersburg, Russia.
“Two Socialist Revolutionaries disguised as police officers brought a powerful
dynamite bomb hidden in a large, ornate vase into the villa of newly appointed
Prime Minister Pytor A. Stolypin, where a reception was underway” (Mattox,
2004, p. 17). The bomb detonated killing over thirty people and injuring over 30
others. The Prime Minister survived the attack but his teenage daughter died and
his 3-year-old son sustained injuries. Two accomplices were captured outside of
the villa and were immediately incarcerated.
March 5, 1975: Eight terrorist, belonging to the PLO, entered the Savoy
Hotel, located in Tel Aviv, Israel. They took multiple hostages, secured
themselves on the highest floor, and attempted to negotiate the release of fellow
terrorists who were in Israeli custody. Negotiations failed and Israeli forces
launched a rescue mission during which 3 soldiers died and several hostages‟
sustained injuries. “The terrorists retreated to a room and blew themselves up
when commandos broke in” (Mattox, 2004, p. 91). Eight hostages died as a
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result of the incident. One terrorist survived and stated, during a subsequent
interrogation, that the attack was directed toward disrupting political talks
between Egypt and Israel.
December 15, 1981: A suicide bomber attacked the Iraqi Embassy in
Beirut, Lebanon. The perpetrator employed a car bomb. The explosion resulted
in the death of at least 25 people.
November 11, 1982: A suicidal terrorist attack occurred in Tyre, Lebanon.
The perpetrator employed a truck bomb to target an Israeli Military facility. The
blast resulted in the death of more than 70 people to include a large number of
Israeli military personnel. “The Palestinian group Hizballah claims responsibility
for the attack” (Maxwell, 2003, p. 447).
April 18, 1983: Beirut, Lebanon was the location of one of the first suicidal
terrorist attacks against U.S. citizens. “Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for a
suicide truck bomb attack on the U.S. embassy” (Mattox, 2004, p. 109). A stolen
truck was equipped with a 400-pound explosive device that shattered the
embassy killing 63 people of Lebanese and American nationality. Over a hundred
others were wounded.
October 23, 1983: A suicidal terrorist drove a truck, equipped with over
two thousand pounds of explosives, into a U.S. Marine facility in Beirut, Lebanon.
“At 6:20 a.m., the explosives laden vehicle crashed through a wrought-iron plate,
hitting the sand-bagged guard post, smashing through another barrier, and
ramming over a wall of sandbags into the lobby, exploding with terrific force”
(Mattox, 2004, p. 110). More than 200 U.S. Marines were killed as a result of the
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explosion. The military facility was part of an international airport and included
Marine barracks. “Less than two minutes after the initial attack, another suicidal
truck bomber with 600 pounds of TNT plowed into a French paratrooper barracks
two miles north and collapsed the building with its blast” (Mattox, 2004, p. 110). A
total of 58 French soldiers died as a result of the attack. U.S. and French forces
composed part of a peacekeeping force during the time of the incident. This
incident prompted a withdraw of U.S. military forces in February of 1984. This
withdraw was viewed as a great success for terrorists who aimed to dislodge the
U.S. presence. This single incident rallied the terrorist community and
demonstrated that suicidal terrorism can impact foreign policy. Hizballah was
responsible for the attack.
December 12, 1983: Terrorist struck Kuwait City, Kuwait. Suicidal terrorist
detonated a car bomb within close proximity to the U.S. Embassy. At least six
people died and many others were wounded. A series of smaller attacks
occurred throughout the country targeting U.S. interest, an oil facility, an airport,
and other government offices. “Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility” (Mattox,
2004, p. 111).
September 20, 1984: A suicidal terrorist detonated a truck bomb on the
site of a U.S. embassy annex located in Aukar, Lebanon. At least sixteen people
were killed and a British ambassador was wounded. Over 50 people sustained
injuries. “The Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility” (Mattox, 2004, p. 112).
April 20, 1985: A suicidal terrorist attack was conducted in Aoun, Lebanon.
A teenaged female militant leader orchestrated an attack against Israeli Defense
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Forces. Loula Abboud and a small assembly of her supporters ambushed a
group of Israeli soldiers. She subsequently became surrounded by IDF soldiers
and detonated a bomb when they came within striking distance. She killed
herself in an effort to kill others.
May 25, 1985: A terrorist attack occurred in Kuwait City, Kuwait. “The emir
of Kuwait, Sheikh Jaber al-Ahmed al-Sabah, escaped death at the hands of a
suicide car bomber” (Mattox, 2004, p. 115). The terrorist drove a car, equipped
with explosives, into the sheikh‟s motorcade. The ensuing explosion reportedly
resulted in the death of two of the sheikh‟s bodyguards, one innocent bystander,
and the perpetrator. The perpetrator was a member of the Islamic Jihad.
May 21, 1991: A suicide bomber struck a political rally in Chennai, India.
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam orchestrated this deadly and politically
charged attack. A young Sri Lankan female infiltrated a rally where former Prime
Minister Rajiv Gandhi was present. She approached Gandhi, knelt at his feet,
offered flowers, and then detonated her explosives laden belt. Gandhi died
instantly. “Eighteen additional people including the bomber were killed in the
blast and thirty-three injured; policeman made up less than half of both totals”
(Mattox, 2004, p. 126). Gandhi was targeted, in part, because he ordered
government forces to stop an uprising of the Tamil Tigers during his time in
office. Investigations revealed that the attack was well planned and aided by over
a dozen members of the terrorist group. Several successful prosecutions
followed and at least 4 conspirators received a death sentence. “The two alleged
masterminds of the plot, Sivarasan and Peria Santham, died in India in
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confrontations with Indian police later that year, either in shoot outs or as
suicides” (Mattox, 2004, p. 126).
May 1, 1993: President Ranasinghe Premadasa was assassinated by
means of a suicide bombing in Colombo, Sri Lanka. A young girl rode a bicycle,
equipped with explosives, into the presidential motorcade. “The authorities
immediately suspected Tamil Tiger (LTTE) complicity and arrested forty people,
mostly Tamils” (Mattox, 2004, p. 129). The subsequent investigation was
inconclusive and evidence, supporting a conviction, was lacking.
October 19, 1994: A terrorist attack transpired in Tel Aviv, Israel. “A
Hamas suicide bomber killed twenty-two civilians and injured forty-seven when
he set off his explosives on a passenger bus in the center of the city” (Mattox,
2004, p. 132).
April 9, 1995: The Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for a terrorist attack
in the Gaza Strip, Palestine. “A suicide bomber crashed an explosive-laden van
into an Israeli bus, killing eight people” (Mattox, 2004, p. 133). Numerous others
were injured.
August 31,1995: A suicidal terrorist attack occurred in Chandigarh, India.
The perpetrator targeted a political figure named Beant Singh. Pape (2005) noted
the following:
The attack killed Minister Singh, fifteen of his security guards and aides,
and the bomber himself, identified as Dilawar Singh, a young man in his
early twenties who had left a note to his accomplices saying that his act
was “in memory of the martyrs.” (p. 154)
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The terrorist group known as Babbar Khalsa International was responsible for the
attack.
November 19, 1995: Multiple Islamic militant groups claimed responsibility
for a terrorist attack in Islamabad, Pakistan. “A suicide truck bomber drove into
the Egyptian embassy compound and set off an explosion that killed at least
sixteen and injured sixty persons” (Mattox, 2004, p. 135).
January 31, 1996: Suicidal terrorists launched an attack in Colombo, Sri
Lanka. They detonated a 400-pound truck bomb outside of a bank. “The
explosion that followed brought down a large section of the bank building and
killed approximately ninety civilians, injuring more than 1,400” (Mattox, 2004, p.
135). A subsequent gun battle ensued between Tami Tigers and police forces.
February 26, 1996: A terrorist attack occurred in Jerusalem, Israel. “A
suicide bomber blew up a bus near the Central Station, killing twenty-six persons,
most of whom were civilians, and wounding as many as eighty” (Mattox, 2004, p.
136). The attack was most likely a Hamas operation.
March 3, 1996: A suicidal terrorist attack occurred in Jerusalem, Israel.
The attacker detonated explosives on a bus that resulted in the death of nineteen
people and injury of several others. “A splinter group of HAMAS claimed
responsibility” (Mattox, 2004, p. 136).
March 21, 1997: An attack occurred in a pubic area in Tel Aviv, Israel. “A
suicide terrorist killed himself and four other people by setting off a bomb on the
terrace of a Tel Aviv cafe” (Mattox, 2004, p. 140). The attack resulted in the injury
of at least 45 people.
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July 30, 1997: Hamas is accredited with a dual attack in Jerusalem, Israel.
“Two successive suicide bombings in the Mahane Yehuda market place resulted
in the deaths of sixteen people, with 178 hurt” (Mattox, 2004, p. 140).
September 4, 1997: An element of Hamas perpetrated an attack in
Jerusalem, Israel. “Three nail-studded bombs carried by suicide terrorists
exploded in the crowded Ben Yehuda pedestrian shopping mall, killing eight
people including the suicide bombers, and wounding 184” (Mattox, 2004, p. 140).
August 7, 1998: Al-Qaeda orchestrated dual terrorist attacks in Nairobi,
Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. “Truck bombs exploded almost
simultaneously outside two U.S. embassies almost 400 miles apart, killing at
least 300 people” (Mattox, 2004, p. 144). Kenyans sustained the most casualties
and over 4,000 people were wounded. Reports indicated that the Kenyan blast
was equal to what would be produced by more than 500 pounds of TNT. The
Tanzanian blast resulted in at least eleven deaths with over eighty people
wounded. Damage was inadvertently mitigated because a water truck
temporarily blocked the entrance to the embassy. The United States launched
cruise missiles, into terrorist training camps, located in Afghanistan,
approximately two weeks after the terrorist attacks. “A U.S. federal grand jury
later indicted twenty-two men in connection with the attacks, including Saudi
dissident and al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden” (Mattox, 2004, p. 144).
December 18, 1999: A Suicidal terrorists attack was conducted in
Colombo, Sri Lanka. “President Chandrika Kumaratunga was wounded in the
eye and thirty-eight people were killed in a suicide bombers attack at an election
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rally” (Mattox, 2004, p. 149). At least 50 others were wounded. The Tamil Tigers
were prime suspects in the incident.
January 5, 2000: A Suicidal terrorists attack was carried out in Colombo,
Sri Lanka. “At least eleven people died and twenty-nine were wounded when a
suicide bomber set off an explosion near the office of Prime Minister Sirimavo
Bandaranaike” (Mattox, 2004, p. 150). The Prime Minister was not in her office
during the attack and was not injured. Reports indicate the perpetrator was a
woman who detonated her explosives when approached by authorities.
June 8, 2000: A terrorist attack occurred in Colombo, Sri Lanka. “A suicide
bomber assassinated Industry Minister C.V. Gooneratne, himself, and twentyfour others, including the minister‟s wife” (Mattox, 2004, p. 151). Several other
people were wounded. The assassin was likely a Tamil Tiger.
September 15, 2000: A suicidal terrorist attack occurred in Colombo, Sri
Lanka. “A suicide bomber, thought to be a Tamil Tiger, killed himself and six
others in an apparent attempt to disrupt campaigning for the following months
elections” (Mattox, 2004, p. 151). Other people sustained multiple injuries. The
incident occurred within close proximity to the entrance to a hospital.
October 3, 2000: A Suicidal terrorists attack was conducted in Muttur, Sri
Lanka. “A Tamil Tiger suicide bomber killed a Muslim parliamentary candidate,
Mohammed Baithullah, who was departing a campaign stop” (Mattox, 2004, p.
152). Several fatalities occurred and over 20 people were wounded. Baithullah
had survived several assassination attempts during his career.
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October 12, 2000: Al-Qaeda perpetrated a terrorist attack against a U.S.
Navy ship in Aden, Yemen. Terrorists employed a small watercraft to get within
close proximity to the USS Cole while it was in port. They detonated a bomb that
heavily damaged the ship. “Seventeen sailors were killed and thirty-nine injured
in a suicide assault that set the stage for the attack on the United States proper
eleven months later” (Mattox, 2004, p. 152).
October 19, 2000: A terrorist assault occurred in Colombo, Sri Lanka. A
suicidal terrorist exploded a bomb in a town hall. Four people were reported killed
and over twenty others were wounded. “The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) were thought to be responsible” (Mattox, 2004, p. 152).
March 28, 2001: An attack occurred in Kefar Sava, Israel. “A suicide
bomber from a wing of Hamas set off a bomb at a bus stop, killing two people
and wounding four others” (Mattox, 2004, p. 154).
April 22, 2001: A terrorist attack unfolded in Kfar Sava, Israel. “A Hamas
suicide bomber detonated explosives near a bus stop, killing one person and
injuring sixty” (Mattox, 2004, p. 154).
June 1, 2001: A Hamas attack occurred in Tel Aviv, Israel. The target was
a fashionable nightclub. “A suicide bomber approached the establishment and
abruptly set off a blast that resulted in the deaths of twenty people and injury to
well over 100” (Mattox, 2004, p. 154).
August 9, 2001: A suicidal terrorist detonated a bomb in Jerusalem, Israel.
A young terrorist named Izzidene al Masri targeted the Sbarro Pizzeria. “Al Masri
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killed sixteen people, six of them children” (Davis, 2004, p. 99). Over 100 civilians
were wounded. The perpetrator was of Palestinian identity.
September 11, 2001: Al-Qaeda orchestrated a series of well coordinated,
well funded, and dramatic terrorist attacks against the United States of America.
Mattox (2004) noted the following:
Al-Qaeda operatives, numbering nineteen in all, on a suicide mission
crashed two fully fueled jetliners- huge flying incendiary bombs, in effect –
into the Twin Towers of New York‟s World Trade Center; another jetliner
crashed into the Pentagon in Washington, headquarters and nerve center
of U.S. military forces. (p. 155)
A fourth jetliner, likely targeting Washington, crashed in Pennsylvania. The death
toll from this series of attacks exceeded 2,950 people.
December 1, 2001: Two suicide terrorists conducted an attack in
Jerusalem, Israel. They detonated bombs inside of a popular mall. At least 10
people were killed and over 100 were wounded. Hamas claimed responsibility for
the bombing.
December 2, 2001: A suicide attacker struck within Haifa, Israel. A
member of Hamas detonated explosives while on a bus. Approximately 15
people were killed and several more were injured.
January 27, 2002: A female terrorist conducted an operation in Jerusalem,
Israel. The perpetrator detonated a concealed bomb. She killed at least 1 person
and wounded about 100.
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March 2, 2002: A suicide bomber conducted an operation in Jerusalem,
Israel. The perpetrator, later identified as 19 year-old Mohammed Ahmed
Draghmeh, targeted a crowd of people exiting a synagogue. “Ten people were
killed, including an 18-month-old Jewish girl” (Davis, 2004, p. 101). Over 50
others were wounded. The perpetrator served in the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade that
was a component of the Fatah terrorist organization.
March 9, 2002: A terrorist attack unfolded in Jerusalem, Israel. A suicide
bomber detonated a bomb inside of a restaurant. The blast resulted in 11
fatalities and over 50 injuries. “Hamas claims responsibility” (Maxwell, 2003, p.
467).
March 21, 2002: A suicidal terrorist attack occurred in Jerusalem, Israel.
The perpetrator detonated a bomb that caused the deaths of at least 3 people
and wounded approximately 80. Islamic Jihad, a component of Hizballah,
claimed responsibility.
March 27, 2002: A terrorist attack was performed in Netanya, Israel. The
perpetrator detonated a suicide bomb inside of a popular dining facility that was a
part of the Park Hotel. More than 20 people died and over 100 more were
injured. “Hamas claims responsibility for the attack” (Maxwell, 2003, p. 468).
April 11, 2002: A terrorist attack occurred in Djerba, Tunisia. A terrorist
employed a truck bomb, equipped with propane, to strike a synagogue.
Approximately 16 people died in the explosion and several others were injured.
The victims were from France, Germany, and Tunisia. A radical Islamic
fundamentalist group claimed responsibility.
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April 12, 2002: A female terrorist conducted an operation in Jerusalem,
Israel. She detonated a bomb that killed at least 5 people and injured
approximately 90 others. The al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, an element of Fatah,
claimed responsibility.
June 19, 2002: A suicidal terrorist struck a public area in Jerusalem,
Israel. The perpetrator detonated a bomb at a bus stop. At least 5 people were
killed including 2 Americans. More than 30 others were injured. The al-Aqsa
Martyrs Brigade claimed responsibility for the attack.
July 17, 2002: Two suicidal terrorists perpetrated an attack in Tel Aviv,
Israel. Members of Islamic Jihad targeted a bus station by means of explosives.
The blast resulted in at least 5 fatalities and numerous injuries. Chinese and
Romanian citizens were among the victims.
August 4, 2002: A terrorist attack was conducted in Safed, Israel. A
suicide bomber detonated explosives on a bus. The event caused the deaths of
at least 8 people including 2 Philippine citizens. Many others were wounded
including several members of the Israeli military. Hamas was responsible for the
attack.
September 19, 2002: A terrorist attack was conducted in Tel Aviv, Israel. A
suicide bomber exploded a bomb on a bus. The incident caused the deaths of at
least 6 people. Several others were wounded. Hamas was accountable for the
assault.
November 21, 2002: A suicidal terrorist attack occurred in Jerusalem,
Israel. The perpetrator detonated a bomb on a bus. The event caused the deaths
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of at least 10 people and many others were wounded. A Romanian citizen was
among the dead. Hamas is accredited with the attack.
November 28, 2002: A suicidal terrorist attack occurred in Mombasa,
Kenya. Terrorists who employed a car bomb targeted a popular tourist hotel.
Approximately 15 people were killed and many more were wounded. Israeli
tourists were known to frequent the hotel. Additionally, a non-suicidal terrorist
mission was coordinated in addition to the car bombing. Terrorists shot two
shoulder-fired missiles at an aircraft destined to arrive in Israel. Fortunately, both
missiles missed their target. Al-Qaeda involvement is strongly suspected.
January 5, 2003: Two suicidal terrorist attacks occurred in Tel Aviv, Israel.
The perpetrators employed explosives to inflict damage on innocent people. The
explosions resulted in at least 22 deaths and 100 injuries. The al-Aqsa Martyrs
Brigade was responsible for the violence.
March 5, 2003: A terrorist operation unfolded in Haifa, Israel. A suicide
bomber exploded a bomb on a bus. Approximately 15 people died from the
explosion. Many others were wounded.
March 30, 2003: A suicide bombing occurred in Netanya, Israel. A terrorist
detonated explosives that injured approximately 35 people. Only the perpetrator
died. Islamic Jihad stated that they orchestrated the attack on behalf of the Iraqi
people.
May 12, 2003: Al-Qaeda conducted a highly coordinated terrorist attack in
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Several suicide bombers attacked residential compounds
that housed foreign employees. Approximant 25 victims were killed during the
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attacks. Citizens of the United States, United Kingdom, Philippines, Ireland, and
Saudi Arabia were among the dead. Nine perpetrators also died from their
suicide bombs. Subsequent investigations resulted in the identification and arrest
of several suspected operatives who had links to al-Qaeda.
May 16, 2003: A series of well-coordinated terrorist attacks were
orchestrated in Casablanca, Morocco. Twelve perpetrators, armed with suicide
bombs, attacked 5 separate targets. A Belgian Consulate, Jewish community,
Jewish cemetery, hotel, and Spanish restaurant fell victim to suicide bombings.
The series of operations resulted in the death of at least 40 people, injury of over
90 others, and substantial property damage. Al-Qaeda involvement is strongly
suspected.
May 18, 2003: A suicidal terrorist struck a target in Jerusalem, Israel. The
perpetrator employed a suicide bomb to attack a bus. The explosion killed at
least 6 people and wounded others. Hamas declared responsibility for the attack.
May 19, 2003: A female terrorist conducted an operation in Afula, Israel.
She detonated a suicide bomb inside of a shopping center. The explosion killed
and wounded several people. At least two separate militant Islamic
fundamentalist terrorist organizations claimed responsibility for the attack.
June 11, 2003: A suicide terrorist attack occurred in Jerusalem, Israel. The
assailant detonated a bomb on a bus. Approximately 16 people were killed and
at least 65 were wounded. Hamas affirmed responsibility citing revenge for
Israel‟s attack on Hamas leader Abdelaziz al-Rantisi as motivation for the
operation.

119
August 19, 2003: A suicide bombing occurred in Jerusalem, Israel. The
terrorist targeted a bus. Approximately 20 people died from the explosion and at
least 90 others were injured. Several American citizens perished in the blast.
Hamas and Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for the violence.
September 22, 2003: Terrorists targeted the United Nations headquarters
in Baghdad, Iraq. The perpetrator detonated a car bomb. At least 1 person was
killed. Several others were injured.
October 4, 2003: A suicidal terrorist attack occurred in Haifa, Israel. A
Palestinian woman, targeting a restaurant, detonated a suicide bomb. The blast
resulted in at least 15 fatalities and approximately 50 others were wounded.
Islamic Jihad, a component of Hizballah, was responsible for the act.
October 12, 2003: Suicidal terrorists conducted an operation in Baghdad,
Iraq. Two separate terrorists, working together, drove car bombs within close
proximity to a Baghdad hotel. Both explosions resulted in a death toll of at least
5. More than 30 others were wounded. People inside of the hotel, including
several American citizens, were not injured.
November 12, 2003: Suicidal terrorists detonated a bomb in Baghdad,
Iraq. The perpetrators employed a vehicle borne improvised explosive device to
attack an Italian military police facility. The blast killed at least 15 Italians and 11
Iraqis. Approximately 100 other people sustained injuries.
November 15, 2003: Terrorists used suicidal tactics when they launched
two attacks in Istanbul, Turkey. Perpetrators detonated two truck bombs outside
of two separate synagogues. The combined death toll was at least 20 with
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hundreds more wounded. Numerous terrorists claimed responsibility including a
Turkish militant group and several militant Islamic fundamentalist organizations. It
is unclear which terrorist organization actually orchestrated the attack but alQaeda is among the suspects.
November 20, 2003: Terrorists conducted dual attacks in Istanbul, Turkey.
The perpetrators targeted the British Consulate General and a British bank. They
used truck bombs to attack their targets. The combined death toll was at least 25
and over 400 others were injured. Roger Short, a Consulate General, was killed
in the attack. Al-Qaeda is strongly suspected of arranging the suicide bombings.
December 5, 2003: A deadly terrorist attack unfolded in Yessentuki,
Russia. A suicidal attacker detonated an explosive on a commuter train. The
explosion killed at least 40 people, injured many others, and caused substantial
property damage. The Chechen Rebels are suspected of carrying out the
operation. Aslan Maskhadov, a rebel leader, denied involvement.
December 9, 2003: A suicide bombing occurred in Moscow, Russia. A
woman detonated a bomb targeting the National Hotel. Approximately 5 people
were killed and about 20 more were sustained injuries.
December 15, 2003: A terrorist attack took place in Ameriyah, Iraq. The
assailant detonated a vehicle borne improvised explosive device and targeted
Iraqi police forces. Several policemen were wounded.
December 24, 2003: A terrorist attack occurred in Irbil, Iraq. A suicide car
bomber attacked the Kurdish Interior Ministry. The explosion killed at least 5
people and wounded about 100.
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December 25, 2003: A high profile terrorist attack was conducted in
Rawalpindi, Pakistan. Two suicidal terrorist targeted president Musharraf while
he was traveling via motorcade. The perpetrators detonated vehicle borne
explosives that killed at least 10 people and injured more. The president was
uninjured. Terrorists, who subscribe to a militant Islamic fundamentalist
philosophy, are suspected of organizing and perpetrating the attack.
March 28, 2004: A female terrorist detonated a bomb in the Bukhara
region of Uzbekistan. The suicide bomber targeted an apartment block. The blast
resulted in several deaths and injuries.
April 21, 2004: A terrorist incident transpired in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. A
suicidal terrorist used a car bomb to attack a police headquarters. The attacker
may have targeted a high profile U.S. representative who was scheduled to
participate in a nearby meeting close to the time of the explosion. The explosion
resulted in several fatalities and over 100 injuries. The U.S. representative was
not injured. Al-Qaeda is strongly suspected of organizing the attack.
May 7, 2004: A suicidal terrorist operation occurred in Karachi, Pakistan.
More than 20 people were killed and over 100 sustained injuries when a terrorist
detonated a bomb in a mosque.
May 22, 2004: A suicidal terrorist attempted to assassinate a political
figure in Baghdad, Iraq. A suicide bomber targeted a Deputy Interior Minister who
was a member of a Shiite political party. The terrorist employed a vehicle borne
improvised explosive device to deliver an explosion outside of the Deputy Interior

122
Minister‟s home. The explosion caused several deaths and injuries. The Deputy
Interior Minister sustained injuries but survived the attack.
August 24, 2004: A highly coordinated dual terrorist attack occurred in
Russia. Two commercial airplanes crashed as a result of suicide bombers. None
of the occupants survived the crashes. The attacks are attributed to two female
“Black Widows” identified as Satsita Dzhebirkhanova and Amanata Nagayeva.
Both women were Chechen Rebels.
August 31, 2004: A suicidal terrorist attack occurred in Moscow, Russia. A
female terrorist, identified as Roza Magayeva, concealed explosives as she
approached a crowded subway station. She detonated her explosives outside of
the entrance killing at least 10 people and injuring dozens. Magayeva was also
linked to the deadly airline bombings by way of a kinship with one of the hijackers
and membership in the same terrorist group. The Chechen Rebels were
responsible for the attack.
September 9, 2004: A terrorist attacked the Australian Embassy in
Jakarta, Indonesia. A suicide bomber drove an explosives laden vehicle within
close proximity to the Embassy and detonated the explosives. Several people
died in the explosion and over 170 people were wounded. The Jemaah Islamiya
terrorist organization, a radical Islamic fundamentalist group, was responsible for
the attack.
January 20, 2005: A suicidal terrorist conducted an operation in
Sheberghan, Afghanistan. The bomber targeted a religious/political leader as he
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was participating in social event inside a park. The target was not injured but the
blast did injure several others.
February 19, 2005: A suicide terrorist operation occurred in Baghdad, Iraq.
A team of suicide bombers detonated explosives in a public area. They targeted
a group of religious people who were participating in an Ashura ceremony. At
least 4 people were killed and more were injured.
March 19, 2005: A suicidal terrorist attack occurred in Doha, Qatar. An
Egyptian terrorist detonated a vehicle borne improvised explosive device as he
crashed the vehicle into a theater. The blast caused several injuries and possibly
one fatality in addition to property damage. The theater was likely targeted
because it was popular among westerners and it was in close proximity to a
British school. Several terrorist organizations, with militant Islamic fundamentalist
agendas, claimed responsibility.
April 7, 2005: A suicide bombing occurred in Cairo Egypt. An engineering
student, attending Zagazig University, constructed a bomb using a bag filled with
TNT and nails. He detonated his device inside of a popular bazaar. The
explosion resulted in several fatalities and injuries. One American and two
French nationals were among the dead. A terrorist organization, boasting a
militant Islamic fundamentalist agenda, claimed responsibility for the attack via
an Internet posting.
April 14, 2005: A terrorist attack occurred in Mahaweel, Iraq. A suicide
bomber detonated explosives in a market. The explosion produced fatalities that
included a several policeman. Several others were injured.
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April 30, 2005: A terrorist attack occurred in Cairo, Egypt. A suicide
bomber jumped off of a bridge and detonated his explosives in mid air. The
explosion injured several people, including foreign tourists, who were visiting a
popular square below. This incident is connected with the attack that occurred on
April 7, 2005.
May 23, 2005: A suicide terrorist struck a target in Baghdad, Iraq. The
bomber used a vehicle borne improvised explosive device to kill Iraqis attending
a religious service outside of the Abul-Fadi Abbas mosque. Several Shiites were
killed or wounded in the attack. The Sunni Insurgency of Iraq was likely
responsible for the attack.
May 7, 2005: A suicide bombing occurred in Kabul, Afghanistan. The
perpetrator detonated explosives inside of an Internet cafe that was frequented
by foreign nationals. The explosion killed and injured several of the occupants
and caused property damage.
May 27, 2005: A suicide terrorist attack took place in Islamabad, Pakistan.
The suicide bomber detonated explosives at the site of a Shiite mosque. At least
15 people were killed and approximately 100 were injured.
June 11, 2005: A terrorist conducted an attack in Baghdad, Iraq. A suicide
bomber struck the Slovakian Embassy. The attack was carried out by way of a
vehicle borne improvised explosive device. At least 3 people were injured in the
attack. No fatalities were reported with exception to the perpetrator.
July 4, 2005: A terrorist operation took place in Bande Sardeh,
Afghanistan. A suicide bomber, riding a bicycle, detonated an explosive as a car
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passed. A Turkish engineer was traveling in the vehicle. The driver of the vehicle
was killed.
July 7, 2005: A series of well-coordinated suicidal terrorist attacks
occurred in London, England. Four suicide bombers targeted the London
transportation system. They detonated explosives within 3 separate subway cars
and one bus. The attack resulted in the death of over 50 innocent people.
Numerous injuries and material damage was also reported. Subsequent
investigations suggest that Al-Qaeda was responsible for the attack.
August 24, 2005: A suicide terrorist attack occurred in Baghdad, Iraq. The
perpetrator detonated a vehicle borne improvised explosive device within close
proximity to a government convoy. An Iraqi Defense Minister was targeted but
not killed. Several bystanders sustained injuries from the blast.
October 1, 2005: A series of coordinated suicide bombings occurred in
Bali, Indonesia. Several terrorist detonated explosives in facilities frequented by
foreign tourists. At least 20 people were killed and over 100 were injured. A small
number of Americans were among the wounded. The Jemaah Islamiya terrorist
organization, a radical Islamic fundamentalist group, is strongly suspected of
orchestrating the deadly attacks.
November 7, 2005: A suicidal terrorist attack was attempted in Lashkar
Gah, Afghanistan. The attacker detonated a car bomb within close proximity to a
government official. The explosion was non-casualty producing and few injuries
were reported. The bomber survived however he lost all of his arms and legs.
The Taliban claimed responsibility for the failed attack.
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November 19, 2005: A terrorist attacked citizens in Abu Saida, Iraq. A
suicide bomber employed a vehicle borne improvised explosive device to strike a
Shiite funeral tent. Approximately 50 people were killed and many more were
wounded. Sunni insurgents were responsible for the attack.
June 28, 2006: A suicidal terrorist attack occurred in Baqubah, Iraq. The
perpetrator employed a vehicle borne improvised explosive device. The
explosives were detonated outside of a Sunni mosque. The attack killed and
wounded several civilians. Shiite insurgents are suspected of organizing the
attack.
July 14, 2006: A terrorist operation took place in Abbas, Pakistan. A
suicidal terrorist detonated a bomb within close proximity to the home of a Shia
political leader. The blast killed the leader and one of his relatives. Several other
people, including law enforcement officials, were injured.
August 6, 2006: A terrorist executed a suicide mission in Tikrit, Iraq. The
perpetrator detonated a concealed bomb inside of a funeral tent. The funeral
honored a relative of a local politician. At least 8 people died in the attack and
several others were injured.
August 10, 2006: A suicide bomber conducted a terrorist operation in
Najaf, Iraq. The perpetrator targeted a highly populated area with symbolic
religious significance. The terrorist detonated a bomb within close proximity to
the Imam Ali Mosque and a market. The mosque is an extremely sacred site for
Shiites because it houses the tomb of Ali, who was a relative of the Prophet
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Mohammad. The blast killed over 30 people and injured over 100 others. Sunni
insurgents were responsible for the attack.
September 11, 2006: A terrorist attack occurred in Hisarak, Afghanistan. A
teenaged terrorist detonated a suicide bomb during a funeral ceremony. The
funeral was for the governor of the Paktia Province who recently died during a
Taliban attack. Several civilians were killed and others were wounded during the
funeral bombing.
September 18, 2006: A terrorist incident transpired in Herat, Afghanistan.
A terrorist detonated explosives, concealed on his body, outside of a mosque. At
least 10 people were killed and several others were injured.
October 3, 2006: A suicidal terrorist launched an attack in Baghdad, Iraq.
The perpetrator detonated a bomb, concealed on his body, while walking through
an outdoor market. Several civilians were killed and at least 15 people sustained
injuries. The attack occurred in a mostly Sunni district of the city. Shiite
insurgents are suspected of organizing the attack.
October 16, 2006: A carefully planned terrorist attacked occurred in
Baghdad, Iraq. A suicidal terrorist made use of a vehicle borne improvised
explosive device when he targeted a Shiite funeral tent. The explosion caused
numerous civilian fatalities and injuries. A subsequent explosion targeted the
emergency response personnel who responded to the incident. Members of the
Sunni Insurgency were responsible for the attack.
October 19, 2006: A suicidal terrorist attack transpired in Mosul, Iraq. The
perpetrator drove a fuel tanker, outfitted with explosives, into a police station. The
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ensuing explosion killed and injured several people including civilian bystanders.
The attack caused substantial damage to the station and rendered many police
vehicles inoperable.
October 31, 2006: A suicidal terrorist attack occurred in Andar,
Afghanistan. The perpetrator detonated concealed explosives outside of a
government office. One police officer was killed and another was injured. The
Taliban is suspected of arranging the attack.
November 7, 2006: A terrorist incident took place in Khost, Afghanistan. A
suicidal terrorist detonated explosives within close proximity to a politician‟s
vehicle. The perpetrator targeted the district chief of Tanai. The chief was
wounded as well as his driver and bodyguards.
November 9, 2006: A suicidal terrorist targeted civilians in Baghdad, Iraq.
The perpetrator detonated explosives as he drove a vehicle into a populated
market. Several civilians died and others were wounded from the explosion.
November 17, 2006: A suicidal terrorist attack occurred in Peshawar,
Pakistan. The perpetrator, later identified as Nadeem Khan, detonated
explosives beside of a police van. Two police officers were injured.
November 19, 2006: A terrorist operation took place in Hillah, Iraq. The
perpetrator convinced a group of job seeking citizens to gather around his car by
offering them a job. Once the predominantly Shiite crowd was within close
proximity to the perpetrators vehicle, he detonated a suicide bomb. The
explosion resulted in the death of more than 20 civilians. At least 40 of the
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survivors were wounded. Sunni insurgents were suspected of planning the attack
and foreign nationals from Syria and Egypt were allegedly involved.
December 3, 2006: A terrorist attack transpired in Bannu, Pakistan. A
suicide bomber detonated his explosives as police officers approached his
vehicle. The incident occurred at a checkpoint. One police officer was killed and
another was wounded by the blast.
December 9, 2006: A terrorist targeted a religious site in Karbala, Iraq.
The perpetrator detonated a vehicle borne improvised explosive device within
very close proximity of the al-Abbas shrine. The religious site is of particular
importance to Shiites because it is the last resting place of Imam al-Abbas, who
was a key historical leader for Shiite Muslims. Several civilians perished in the
blast. Over 40 survivors sustained injuries. Sunni Insurgents were responsible for
the attack.
December 12, 2006: A suicide bomber conducted an attack in Helmand,
Afghanistan. The perpetrator detonated a concealed bomb inside of a political
office. The governor of Helmand, who was unharmed by the blast, was the
intended target. Several people died in the blast and others sustained injuries.
The Taliban was responsible for the bombing.
January 6, 2007: A suicidal terrorist attack occurred in Ambalangoda, Sri
Lanka. A woman detonated explosives, concealed on her body, while traveling
on a bus. More than 10 passengers died and more were wounded. The “Black
Tigers” component of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam were responsible for
the attack.
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July 6, 2007: A series of suicide attacks occurred throughout the Diyala
province of Iraq and resulted in the death of over 40 civilians. The attacks appear
to have been a coordinated effort by the Sunni insurgency. Several Shiite
interests were targeted including a market that sold Iranian merchandise and a
funeral tent.
July 7, 2007: A suicidal terrorist attack occurred in Amerli, Iraq. The
perpetrator(s) detonated a truck bomb that was equipped with approximately 2
tons of explosives. The blast occurred in a populated marketplace and resulted in
over 100 fatalities and a plethora of injuries. The incident occurred in the
Salaheddin province and specifically targeted civilians. Kurds and Shiite
Turkmens predominantly occupied the targeted area. The attack was likely
orchestrated by the Sunni insurgency.
July 16, 2007: A substantial suicidal terrorist attack was conducted in
Kirkuk, Iraq. A truck bomb exploded in a crowded area. More than 75 civilians
were killed and over 100 were wounded. The explosion left behind a 30-foot
crater and damaged a section of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan‟s main office.
Kirkuk has the potential to produce large amounts of oil and generate substantial
capital. The city has served as a hub for tensions between most political,
residential, and insurgent groups who operate in Iraq.
July 24, 2007: A failed suicidal attack was conducted in the Baluchistan
province of Pakistan. The perpetrator, Abdullah Mehsud, detonated explosives
as Pakistani security forces approached him. He succeeded in killing himself yet
failed to inflict serious damage on his target. Mehsud was once incarcerated in
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the U.S. operated prison facility located in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. He was
released in March of 2004. Mehsud was a ranking member of the Taliban and
supported Al-Qaeda operations.
July 25, 2007: Suicide bombers conducted two separate operations in
Baghdad, Iraq. The first operation targeted scores of civilians who were
celebrating in the street following an Iraqi soccer team victory. The bombing
resulted in the death of more than 25 people and injury of at least 70. The
second operation occurred within close proximity to an Iraqi army checkpoint.
Terrorists employed a vehicle borne improvised explosive device that killed at
least 20 and wounded about 60 people.
July 27, 2007: A suicidal terrorist operation was carried out in Islamabad,
Pakistan. A suicide bomber targeted a restaurant that was in close proximity to
the iconic Red Mosque. The mosque has served as the symbolic center of
resistance for Pakistan‟s pro U.S. president. The government had ordered a
repainting of the mosque days earlier. The structure lost its red color that
symbolized martyrdom. Protestors rallied against the mandated change, staged
shootings, detonated roadside bombs, and engaged in the noted suicide mission
as a means of expressing disapproval for the change.
August 14, 2007: A series of 4 coordinated suicide bombings were
conducted in the Ninawa province of Iraq. Kurdish and Yazidi communities were
targeted. The operation resulted in at least 175 fatalities and 200 injuries. Several
homes were destroyed. A local political figure, equipped with Kurdish intelligence
information, stated that the attacks were conducted by Al-Qaeda in Iraq.
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August 22, 2007: A suicidal terrorist attack occurred in Baiji, Iraq. A
terrorist, employing a vehicle borne improvised explosive device, targeted a
police station located in the Salaheddin province. The explosion killed at least 35
people and injured many more.
September 5, 2007: A suicidal terrorist attack took place in Mosul, Iraq. A
suicide bomber drove an explosives laden vehicle into a police checkpoint and
detonated the explosives. The attack resulted in the death of at least one Iraqi
policeman. Approximately 25 bystanders, including some merchants, sustained
injuries.
October 25, 2007: A terrorist operation transpired in Mangora, Pakistan.
The perpetrator employed a suicide bomb as he targeted law enforcement
officials. The blast resulted in the death of more than 20 people. Taliban
insurgents are suspected of organizing and executing the suicide mission.
October 30, 2007: A suicidal terrorist attack occurred in Rawalpindi,
Pakistan. The perpetrator concealed explosives on his body as he attempted to
walk through a security checkpoint. Security personnel approached the
perpetrator as he detonated the explosives. The blast killed at least 5 people and
wounded several others. The incident occurred near President Musharraf‟s
office.
November 6, 2007: A suicide bomber triggered an explosion in the
Baghlan Province of Afghanistan. The perpetrator targeted a sugar factory during
a special visit by local and national officials. The explosion killed more than 40
people including many children. A large number of bystanders sustained injuries.
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